<轉載自2019年1月24日 明報 社評>
研究復研究，修訂《防止賄賂條例》全面涵蓋行政長官，迄今仍是只聞樓梯響，政府立場由兩年前承諾「及早啟動立法」，變成「研究後報告結果」，沒有具體落實時間表，市民難免質疑政府「走數」。特首憲制身分具有雙重性，需要同時對中央和特區負責，此一獨特憲制地位，成為修訂防賄條例一大難題，然而這不代表政府可以無了期拖拉。《基本法》明文規定特首需要申報財產，反映中央對特首廉潔也有很高要求，特區政府應與中央商討如何完善法律機制，理順特首獨特憲制地位與法律監管問題，確保反腐沒有缺口。
憲制角色成修例障礙 兩地法律界觀點迥異
本港防賄條例若與國際標準比較，算是相當嚴厲，最大不足之處，就是適用範圍並未全面涵蓋特首。2012年，時任行政長官曾蔭權捲入收受利益風波，引發修訂防賄條例第3及第8條的討論。防賄條例第3條提到，包括政治任命官員和公務員等指定人員，若未得到特首許可而索取或接受利益，即屬犯罪；第8條訂明，任何人向這些指定人員提供利益，同屬犯罪，不過有關條例並不適用於特首。當年政府為了防止及處理特首潛在利益衝突問題，成立檢討委員會，由終審法院前首席法官李國能主持。獨立委員會其後提出36項建議，包括將防賄條例第3及8條涵蓋特首。無論是上任特首梁振英，還是現任特首林鄭月娥，都曾承諾盡快落實建議，可是拖延近7年，至今未見重大進展。
香港是法治社會，強調法律面前人人平等。雖然政務司長張建宗強調，現行防賄條例已「有效防止涉及特首的貪污行為」，即使未修例亦沒有「法律空隙」，可是防賄條例規管所有政治任命官員和公務員，唯獨特首例外，彷彿特首可以凌駕法律之上，予人觀感實在很差。前年7月林鄭月娥上任後，政府向立法會表示會「及早啟動立法」，可是近日的答覆卻變成「研究後報告結果」，聽在市民耳裏，難免懷疑政府食言。
防賄條例未有全面涵蓋特首，問題可以上溯至港英時代，背後牽涉到本港政治體制。港英時代，港督由倫敦當局委任，立法局無權彈劾，廉署直接向港督負責，防賄條例並不適用於港督，負責監督港督操守的是英國政府。回歸後，香港奉行一國兩制，行政長官角色、地位和任免，均與昔日港督有所變化，惟香港並非獨立政治實體，特首身為特區首長，需要同時向中央和港人負責，憲制身分具有獨特雙重性，其中一個最明確的體現，就是特首由本港選舉產生，然而中央擁有實質任命權以至免職權。根據《基本法》，如果特首有嚴重違法或瀆職行為卻不辭職，立法會可動議由終院首席法官領導獨立調查，倘若證據充分，立法會可通過彈劾，「報請中央人民政府決定」。
特首凌駕法律難接受 中央特區可另闢蹊徑
有關條文意味，就算在任特首瀆職違法證據確鑿， 仍需交由中央處置。修訂防賄條例適用範圍涵蓋特首，最複雜之處就是觸及中央、特首與香港之間的三角關係，對此本港與內地法律界觀點不一。例如李國能認為，特首不可能凌駕在法律之上，落實修訂建議不存在法律和憲制障礙；內地法律學者卻認為，修訂防賄條例監管特首並不適當，因為特首是特區最高負責人，廉政專員要向特首負責，未獲授權不得調查作為其上司的特首，鑑於廉政專員是由中央任命，若專員發現特首有可疑之處，應向中央反映，由中央定斷。當年李國能的檢討委員會建議，特首接受利益前要得到法定獨立委員會許可，內地認為這意味委員會的決定可以凌駕特首，做法大有問題，張建宗表示有關修訂未必符合特首獨特憲制地位，所說的正是這一點。
兩地法律界對修訂防賄條例見解迥異，背後反映的是一國兩制之下，香港與內地兩套截然不同的法律觀和制度觀。港人對法治原則有堅持，難以接受特首可以凌駕法律，關鍵是如何在一國兩制框架之內，尋求一個港人滿意又為中央接受的解決方案。修訂防賄條例，應當是優先考慮，當然中央和特區亦可研究其他方法，加強監督特首。舉例說，《基本法》第47條規定，特首就任時要向終審法院首席法官申報財產，條文目標是要特首上任時清楚交代身家，好讓日後比對，監察特首任內是否清廉自持、身家有否暴漲。過去已有內地學者提出，可以考慮就第47條進行本地立法，完善特首財產申報制度，對特首是否需要定期申報財產、如何處理不實申報等事宜，作出明文規定。有關建議可作參考。
防賄條例未全面涵蓋特首行為，屬於制度缺失，港人希望杜絕漏洞；中央重視反腐，強調依法治國，相信亦支持以合適法例，防止和處理特首貪腐問題。這可以成為中央和特區政府的共同立足點。如果特區政府真的認為，修訂防賄條例存在難以踰越的憲制障礙，就應詳細向公眾解釋，同時向中央反映，攜手探討解決之道，而不是一味拖拉，叫市民空等。
Enhancing the law to prevent Chief Executive's bribery
STUDY after study has been conducted on whether the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance (POBO) can be so amended as to fully apply to the Chief
Executive, still there is much cry and little wool. The government's stance has
changed from promising two years ago to "initiate the legislative process
as soon as possible" to simply "report the findings after the
study", without a specific timetable for fulfilling the promise. That
inevitably invites public doubt about whether the government has broken its
word. The Chief Executive has a dual role; their responsibility is to both the
central and the SAR governments. This unique constitutional status has posed a
major problem to the amendment of the ordinance. However, that does not mean
the government should procrastinate indefinitely. The Basic Law's stipulation
that the Chief Executive shall declare his or her assets shows that the central
government also demands a high standard of the Chief Executive's probity. The
SAR government should discuss with the central government the enhancement of
the related legal mechanism so as to straighten out the problems in relation to
the CE's unique constitutional status and legal monitoring and to make sure
there are no loopholes in the laws against corruption.
The anti-corruption laws in Hong Kong are rather strict by international
standards, the biggest inadequacy being that they do not fully apply to the
Chief Executive. Hong Kong upholds the rule of law and emphasises the equality
of all people before the law. Cheung Kin-chung, the Chief Secretary for
Administration, stressed that the existing POBO can already "effectively
regulate the alleged corrupt acts of the Chief Executive" and no
"legal loopholes" exist even when the law is not amended. However, the
fact that the POBO applies to all politically appointed officials and civil
servants except the Chief Executive conveys a picture of the CE's seeming
superiority over the law, which really gives people a very poor impression.
After Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor took office in July 2017, the government told the
Legislative Council that it would "initiate the legislative process as
soon as possible" to amend the law. But in its latest reply to a
lawmaker's question, the government changed its stance and said it would
"report the findings after the study". Such remarks inevitably make
the people doubtful that the government is going back on its word.
According to the Basic Law, if the Chief Executive is accused of serious
breach of law or dereliction of duty but refuses to resign, the Legislative
Council may pass a motion giving a mandate to the Chief Justice of the Court of
Final Appeal to chair an independent investigation committee. If there is
sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges, the Council may pass a motion
of impeachment and "report it to the Central People's Government for
decision". That article means even if there is irrefutable evidence
proving the dereliction of duty by the incumbent CE, the case will have to be
decided by the central government. The most complicated part in extending the
scope of the POBO to include the CE is the involvement of the triangular
relation between the central government, the CE and Hong Kong, regarding which
the local and the mainland legal sectors hold very different views.
Hong Kong people have a strong insistence on the rule of law and find it
difficult to accept the CE's superiority over the law. The key question is how
to find, within the framework of "One country, two systems", a
solution that can both satisfy Hong Kong people and be deemed acceptable by the
central government.
The failure of the POBO to cover the CE's acts comprehensively is a
systemic failure and a loophole that Hong Kong people want to plug. Given that
the central government attaches high importance to the fight against corruption
and its emphasis on the governance of the country in accordance with the law,
supposedly it also supports the prevention of the CE's corruption and the
handling of such cases by means of suitable laws. This can be the starting
point for both the central government and the SAR government. If the SAR
government really believes that the amendment of the POBO involves
insurmountable constitutional obstacles, it should explain that thoroughly to
the public. It should also reflect the issue to and join hands with the central
government to find the solution, rather than procrastinating habitually and
standing people up.
防賄條例規管特首 特區宜尋中央協助
研究復研究，修訂《防止賄賂條例》全面涵蓋行政長官，迄今仍是只聞樓梯響，政府立場由兩年前承諾「及早啟動立法」，變成「研究後報告結果」，沒有具體落實時間表，市民難免質疑政府「走數」。特首憲制身分具有雙重性，需要同時對中央和特區負責，此一獨特憲制地位，成為修訂防賄條例一大難題，然而這不代表政府可以無了期拖拉。《基本法》明文規定特首需要申報財產，反映中央對特首廉潔也有很高要求，特區政府應與中央商討如何完善法律機制，理順特首獨特憲制地位與法律監管問題，確保反腐沒有缺口。
本港防賄條例若與國際標準比較，算是相當嚴厲，最大不足之處，就是適用範圍並未全面涵蓋特首。香港是法治社會，強調法律面前人人平等。雖然政務司長張建宗強調，現行防賄條例已「有效防止涉及特首的貪污行為」，即使未修例亦沒有「法律空隙」，可是防賄條例規管所有政治任命官員和公務員，唯獨特首例外，彷彿特首可以凌駕法律之上，予人觀感實在很差。前年7月林鄭月娥上任後，政府向立法會表示會「及早啟動立法」，可是近日的答覆卻變成「研究後報告結果」，聽在市民耳裏，難免懷疑政府食言。
根據《基本法》，如果特首有嚴重違法或瀆職行為卻不辭職，立法會可動議由終院首席法官領導獨立調查，倘若證據充分，立法會可通過彈劾，「報請中央人民政府決定」。有關條文意味，就算在任特首瀆職違法證據確鑿， 仍需交由中央處置。修訂防賄條例適用範圍涵蓋特首，最複雜之處就是觸及中央、特首與香港之間的三角關係，對此本港與內地法律界觀點不一。
港人對法治原則有堅持，難以接受特首可以凌駕法律，關鍵是如何在一國兩制框架之內，尋求一個港人滿意又為中央接受的解決方案。
防賄條例未全面涵蓋特首行為，屬於制度缺失，港人希望杜絕漏洞；中央重視反腐，強調依法治國，相信亦支持以合適法例，防止和處理特首貪腐問題。這可以成為中央和特區政府的共同立足點。如果特區政府真的認為，修訂防賄條例存在難以踰越的憲制障礙，就應詳細向公眾解釋，同時向中央反映，攜手探討解決之道，而不是一味拖拉，叫市民空等。
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