2017年11月20日 星期一

大陸反獨變促統 兩岸關係臨新局

<轉載自20171120 明報 社評>

與台灣斷交不足半年的巴拿馬總統巴雷拉,正在中國大陸首次訪問,上周四(16日)是兩岸海基海協兩會達成「九二共識」25周年的紀念日,海峽兩岸當日都未見紀念活動。台灣的忽略可以理解,大陸的忽略或許顯示,在中共十九大和「習特會」之後,北京的對台方略已經超越「九二共識」,從「反獨」邁向「促統」,今天的兩岸關係已經進入一個歷史新階段。

促談反獨幾經反覆 時移世易現狀難再

兩岸自1949年分治之後,前30多年一直處於「漢賊不兩立」的對峙階段;1981年北京提出「葉九條」,標誌着「和平統一」政策的出籠,從台灣開放老兵回鄉探親、國統綱領,從「九二共識」到「江八點」、「李六條」,兩岸關係開啟了良性互動新階段,大陸的對台政策旨在「促談」;但1995年李登輝訪美,之後台海導彈危機,再到「兩國論」,民進黨陳水扁上台,兩岸關係又進入一段「冰封期」,其間大陸制定《反分裂法》,兩岸外交戰如火如荼,大陸的對台政策也由「促談」轉為「反獨」,但仍「寄希望於台灣人民」;2008年國民黨馬英九上台,承認「九二共識」,兩岸實現「三通」,外交休兵,大陸經濟送禮,兩岸簽署服貿協定,「習馬會」更令兩岸關係那8年的「小陽春」達到最高峰,但太陽花學運、國民黨敗選,標誌着北京「寄希望於台灣人民」的兩岸政策走到了盡頭。蔡英文上台後,由於拒不承認「九二共識」,兩岸關係再度跌入冰點,台北雖強調「維持現狀」,但卻不知時移世易,兩岸關係的現狀已難再維持。

中共十九大報告明確提出,「解決台灣問題、實現祖國完全統一,是中華民族根本利益所在」,「必須推動兩岸關係和平發展,推進祖國和平統一進程」。這顯示習近平新時代的對台政策,已從過去「反獨」的守勢,轉變為「促統」的攻勢,從過去的順勢而為調整為積極作為、主動而為。

報告將實現「第二個百年」奮鬥目標、即建成社會主義現代化強國的時間訂在2050年,因此被解讀為兩岸「統一時間表」呼之欲出。雖然大陸官方避提甚至否定「時間表」概念,但很難想像習近平描繪的「綜合國力和國際影響力領先的國家」,會是一個國土仍然分裂分治的國家。因此,有人將未來30年中國面臨三大任務總結為現代化建設、國家統一、全球治理,不無道理。

正如有台灣學者分析,未來兩岸關係將會是「五年一小變,十年一大變」,不可能不變。隨着中國政經實力和國際影響力的提升,大陸已漸掌握台海局勢的主動權,對台政策已經超越「和統」「武統」的二者選一,還有「圍困」「逼統」等多種手段。

大陸選項超越和戰 久拖反而對台不利

蔡英文和民進黨或會將希望寄託於美、日等國際因素,但從今次特朗普訪華時「習特會」對台灣議題輕描淡寫,顯示台灣議題在未來中美互動中的重要性會下降。雖然美國仍會向台灣出售軍備,國會也不時以派軍艦停泊台灣、邀台參與演習等議題來挑弄中國神經,但現在沒有人相信中美會因為台灣問題爆發戰爭。

隨着美國「印太戰略」的提出及台灣「南向政策」的實施,日本、印度等國介入台灣問題的可能性升高,或會增加台灣問題的複雜性,台灣問題的性質也可能隨之從以往中美兩大國之間的博弈,變成未來捲入更多第三國。但複雜性的增加,介入者更多,也令北京有了更多牌可打,增加了更多處理台灣問題的手段。近期中韓關係的緩和,中日關係的解凍,安倍也呼籲「習蔡會」,說明只要北京細緻應對,處理台灣問題的難度未必會隨複雜性提高而增加。

十九大之後,北京將愈來愈多地從國際戰略大格局看待台灣問題,即統籌國際國內兩個大局。由前駐聯合國大使劉結一接任新國台辦主任亦可看出,大陸未來將解決台灣問題融入其國際大戰略的一部分。

更重要的是,大陸領導層現在對台的心態已然生變,由於自信時間對自己有利,只要台灣不宣布法理台獨,就不會對大陸造成實質威脅,因此,北京並不急於馬上「地動山搖」出重手,而是用外交施壓、內部分化、經濟融合等手段「溫水煮蛙」,只要台北不承認「一中原則」,就一直拖住台灣。因為北京判斷,兩岸僵局拖下去,台灣內部狀况只會愈糟,統一的成本就愈低。正如台灣前外長歐鴻鍊所言,大陸要完成「中華民族的偉大復興」、「實現中國夢」,就是要解決台灣問題,完成統一。這個步伐會很快,時間不在台灣這邊,台灣政府應該捨棄對抗思維,透過談判來爭取對台灣有利的結果,「拖」不是辦法,而要談,「一中」這個前提很難繞過。

From opposition to Taiwan independence to pursuit of unification

JUAN CARLOS VARELA, the President of the Republic of Panama who severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan less than half a year ago, is now on his first visit to mainland China. Last Thursday (16th November) was the 25th anniversary of the "1992 consensus" which was reached between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and the Straits Exchange Foundation. However, neither side of the Taiwan Strait staged any commemorative events in that regard. While it is easy to understand why Taiwan has failed to do so, the mainland authorities' reluctance to commemorate the consensus might indicate that, after the 19th National Congress and the meeting between Xi Jinping and US president Donald Trump, the Beijing government's policy towards Taiwan has now transcended the 1992 consensus. It is no longer about opposing the independence movement; Beijing is now actively pursuing unification. The cross-strait relations today are now in a new historical stage.

It is unequivocally proposed in the report to the 19th CPC National Congress that "solving the question of Taiwan and implementing the complete unification of the country are in the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation", and that "it is necessary to promote a peaceful development of cross-strait relations, and promote the peaceful unification process of the country." This shows that in the era of Xi Jinping, the policy towards Taiwan has shifted from the defensive "anti-independence" stance to an aggressive "promotion of unification". China is no longer letting things take their course. It is now proactive and purposeful.

The report aims to achieve the objectives of "the second century" — the building of a socialist and modern power — in the year 2050. This has been interpreted as a thinly veiled "timetable for cross-strait unification". Though the mainland authorities have refrained from mentioning the "timetable" concept and have even denied that it is a timetable, it is difficult to imagine that an advanced country in terms of composite national strength and global influence will remain an ununified one. In this light, it is not unreasonable to sum up China's three major tasks over the next thirty years in these terms: modernisation, national unification and global governance.

As a Taiwanese scholar has observed, cross-strait relations in the future will "undergo a small change every five years, and a big change in every ten years". There is simply not the likelihood that the status quo will remain. As China's political and economic strength and global influence rise, the mainland authorities are gradually seizing the initiative in the Taiwan Strait situation. Tsai Ing-wen and her Democratic Progressive Party might pin their hope on the US and Japan. However, as shown by the fact that the topic of Taiwan was given such a cursory treatment during Donald Trump's China visit and his meeting with Xi Jinping, the topic of Taiwan will decrease in importance in Sino-US interactions in the future. Though the US still sells military equipment to Taiwan and from time to time tries to touch China's nerve by sending warships to dock at Taiwan or conducting joint war games with Taiwan, no one will believe that China and the US would be in war simply because of the Taiwan question.

The US has proposed the "Indo-Pacific strategy" and Taiwan has implemented the "Southern Policy". There is a heightened chance of countries like Japan and India meddling in the Taiwan question. This might increase the complexity of the Taiwan question, which in nature might no long involve only the rivalry between China and the US, both superpowers, but more third parties. However, the increase in complexity and stakeholders might leave Beijing with even more tricks up its sleeve when handling the Taiwan question. China's relations with South Korea have improved recently. As Sino-Japanese relations have thawed, Shinzō Abe is now calling for a meeting between Xi and Tsai. This shows as long as Beijing plays the situation methodically, the increased complexity of the Taiwan question will not translate into increased complicatedness.

大陸反獨變促統 兩岸關係臨新局

與台灣斷交不足半年的巴拿馬總統巴雷拉,正在中國大陸首次訪問,上周四(16日)是兩岸海基海協兩會達成「九二共識」25周年的紀念日,海峽兩岸當日都未見紀念活動。台灣的忽略可以理解,大陸的忽略或許顯示,在中共十九大和「習特會」之後,北京的對台方略已經超越「九二共識」,從「反獨」邁向「促統」,今天的兩岸關係已經進入一個歷史新階段。

中共十九大報告明確提出,「解決台灣問題、實現祖國完全統一,是中華民族根本利益所在」,「必須推動兩岸關係和平發展,推進祖國和平統一進程」。這顯示習近平新時代的對台政策,已從過去「反獨」的守勢,轉變為「促統」的攻勢,從過去的順勢而為調整為積極作為、主動而為。

報告將實現「第二個百年」奮鬥目標、即建成社會主義現代化強國的時間訂在2050年,因此被解讀為兩岸「統一時間表」呼之欲出。雖然大陸官方避提甚至否定「時間表」概念,但很難想像習近平描繪的「綜合國力和國際影響力領先的國家」,會是一個國土仍然分裂分治的國家。因此,有人將未來30年中國面臨三大任務總結為現代化建設、國家統一、全球治理,不無道理。

正如有台灣學者分析,未來兩岸關係將會是「五年一小變,十年一大變」,不可能不變。隨着中國政經實力和國際影響力的提升,大陸已漸掌握台海局勢的主動權,蔡英文和民進黨或會將希望寄託於美、日等國際因素,但從今次特朗普訪華時「習特會」對台灣議題輕描淡寫,顯示台灣議題在未來中美互動中的重要性會下降。雖然美國仍會向台灣出售軍備,國會也不時以派軍艦停泊台灣、邀台參與演習等議題來挑弄中國神經,但現在沒有人相信中美會因為台灣問題爆發戰爭。

隨着美國「印太戰略」的提出及台灣「南向政策」的實施,日本、印度等國介入台灣問題的可能性升高,或會增加台灣問題的複雜性,台灣問題的性質也可能隨之從以往中美兩大國之間的博弈,變成未來捲入更多第三國。但複雜性的增加,介入者更多,也令北京有了更多牌可打,增加了更多處理台灣問題的手段。近期中韓關係的緩和,中日關係的解凍,安倍也呼籲「習蔡會」,說明只要北京細緻應對,處理台灣問題的難度未必會隨複雜性提高而增加。

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