蔡英文的三新主張 難融兩岸關係堅冰

<轉載自2017年5月8日 明報 社評>

今天是世界衛生大會（WHA）的網上報名截止期，台灣仍未收到大會邀請函，獲邀出席機會很微。而本月20日將上任滿一年的蔡英文總統，上周提出兩岸間「新情勢、新問卷、新模式」主張時，曾將台灣能否獲邀出席今年的世衛大會當作一個重要指標，稱若此事沒有好好處理，「會讓兩岸關係受到一定程度的傷害」。五二○之後的兩岸關係走勢，再度引人注目。但無論蔡英文搬出台灣民意共識也好，自詡釋出善意也好，只要她繼續迴避「九二共識」，兩岸關係的堅冰就很難打破。

習近平早劃紅線 止步世衛新警號

早在去年台灣大選前，國家主席習近平就對兩岸關係劃了紅線，即「九二共識」是兩岸關係和平發展的政治基礎，「基礎不牢，地動山搖」。蔡英文在去年五二○的就職演說中對「九二共識」隻字未提，被北京指為「未完成的答卷」。一年來兩岸關係雖未地動山搖，卻已跌入冰點。去年的世衛大會，由於介乎馬英九政府與蔡英文政府的交接期，台灣最終還接到了世衛組織註明「一中原則的邀請函」，則今次收不到邀請函，只不過是台灣國際空間遭進一步壓縮的新警號。

用蔡英文總統的話說，她就職後兩岸政策「穩健低調」。與美國當選總統特朗普通話後，並未高調張揚；台社運人士李明哲在大陸被拘，她也未強烈反應；大陸異見人士張向忠在台跳機申請庇護，台方也柔性勸他自願返回大陸。這些動作據說已招致民進黨內強硬派與獨派不滿，指摘蔡英文對北京過於低調與讓步。而大陸對她這些「善意與克制」卻視而不見，或令蔡英文覺得委屈。

蔡英文最近在接受路透社專訪時說，「與其說我沒有完成一個問卷，倒不如說我們雙方都面臨一個新的問卷，我們也期待中國大陸方面可以用不同的角度，來面對這張新的問卷。」上周她在接受《聯合報》專訪時又拋出兩岸「三新」主張，除重複「新問卷」外，又指在國際和地區情勢發生新變化下，大陸應對台採取善意態度，兩岸在變動中，共同維持和平穩定，進行結構性合作。而落腳點，都是以台灣能否出席今年世衛大會視作兩岸關係好壞的指標。

但在北京看來，蔡英文當選以來，一直迴避「九二共識」。民進黨新政府連串作為，從廢除課綱微調、取消遙祭南京中山陵，到停止紀念光復節和孫中山冥誕150周年，再到取消遙祭黃帝陵、降級祭奠鄭成功，都是企圖切斷與大陸政治歷史、中華文化關係的「文化台獨」之舉。而蔡英文與特朗普之間通電話，更屬動搖「一中」原則的「小動作」。

其實蔡英文對大陸也不無強硬之詞，如去年10月她在接受美國《華爾街日報》和日本《讀賣新聞》專訪時就反覆強調，「我們不會在壓力之下屈服」，「我們也想提醒中國大陸，台灣跟台灣人不會在壓力底下屈服」。

執政作為內外情勢 北京台北解讀迥異

蔡英文所謂「新情勢」語焉不詳，但民進黨與北京對此也有不同的觀點。然而民進黨政府沾沾自喜於執政一年來經濟數據比馬英九執政末期時亮麗，民調對蔡英文維持現狀的兩岸政策支持率有五六成，並以此作為與大陸周旋的有力籌碼。但北京卻看到蔡英文上台以來，從年金改革，到勞工假期一例一休，再到同性婚姻合法化進程，在社會上引發連串風波，無不充滿爭議。最新的滿意度調查顯示，認為經濟不好的台灣民眾達八成，約有六成「年輕世代」不滿意蔡英文政府的整體表現，顯示蔡英文的政策，離年輕世代愈來愈遠。

在國際與地區形勢方面，蔡英文或許看到美國新總統特朗普對華強硬的一面，也看到北京近期高度配合美國解決朝核問題的取態，或許認為習近平受困於中共十九大等內部事務，現時無意激化周邊局勢，時局對台有利。

但是，蔡英文可能忽略了特朗普政策的多變性以及其善作交易的商人本質。現時美方恰恰在朝核問題上有求於中方，因此在多個國際問題上對北京放軟手腳，特朗普表態拒絕再與蔡英文通電話，就是顯例。

中共十九大確是習近平今年頭號要務，台灣問題並非當務之急，但統一大業關乎其歷史定位，習近平不太可能在「九二共識」這一底線上有絲毫鬆動。大陸的對台政策，早已由胡錦濤時代的「寄希望於台灣人民」變成「絕不允許任何人以任何形式、任何名義把台灣從祖國分裂出去」。十九大以後，習近平地位更形鞏固，對台讓步的可能性更小，進一步壓縮台灣外交空間的動作可能陸續有來，而蔡英文和民進黨此時若誤判情勢，台灣人民和兩岸關係未來可能要付出重大代價。

Icy cross-strait relations

ONLINE signing-up for this year's World Health Assembly (WHA) closes today, but Taiwan has not yet received the World Health Organisation's invitation. It is quite unlikely for Taiwan officials to be invited to it. Last week, when President Tsai Ing-wen (who will have been in office for one year on May 20) put forward her "new situation, new exam and new mode" ideas about cross-strait relations, she regarded it as an important indicator whether Taiwan officials would be invited to this year's WHA, saying it would "allow cross-strait relations to be harmed to a certain extent" not to handle this matter satisfactorily. It draws attention how cross-strait relations will trend after May 20. However, whether Tsai brings up the Taiwanese's consensus or boasts of her "exuding goodwill", the hard ice of cross-strait relations can scarcely be broken as long as she avoids the "1992 consensus" question.

Tsai has talked about the "new situation", but not in detail. And about it the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Beijing have differing points of view. Since the DPP took office a year ago, Taiwan's economic figures have been more lustrous than they were in the last days of Ma Ying-jeou's presidency. The DPP is therefore very pleased with itself. Furthermore, opinion polls have shown 50% to 60% of Taiwanese support Tsai's cross-strait policy of maintaining the status quo. And the DPP administration regards that as a weighty bargaining counter it can use in dealing with the mainland.

However, Beijing has noticed that all the measures Tsai has taken since she took office (from the annuity reform through "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day" to the legalisation of same-sex marriage) are so controversial as to have aroused strings of troubles. In the latest approval surveys, the percentage of Taiwanese who thought Taiwan's economy was in poor shape amounted to 80%, and about 60% of Taiwanese in "the younger generation" were unhappy with the Tsai administration's overall performance. That shows Tsai's policies are getting farther and farther away from the younger generation.

As for the situation in the region and that in the world, Tsai, seeing that Donald Trump (the new US president) is tough towards China in certain aspects and China has recently assumed an attitude of being highly cooperative in helping the US to tackle the North Korean nuclear problem, may believe that, as Xi Jinping, occupied with such internal matters as the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (shijiuda), has no intention of intensifying the peripheral situation, things are favourable to Taiwan.

Nevertheless, Tsai may have failed to notice Trump is essentially a businessperson good at making deals and he is policy-wise changeable. The US is now soft towards Beijing in connection with a number of international issues because it has to look to China for help in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem. It is a case in point that Trump has declared he will not talk to Tsai again over the phone.

Shijiuda is indeed the number one concern Xi must deal with this year, and the Taiwan question is not what he must handle urgently. However, the great cause of reunifying the country has to do with his positioning in the history books. Xi is very unlikely to budge even a millimetre from the 1992 consensus bottom line. In the Hu Jintao era, the mainland's Taiwan policy was to "pin hopes on the people of Taiwan". It has since changed. Now it is that "in no circumstances should any person be allowed to separate Taiwan from the motherland in any manner or under any pretext". When shijiuda is over, Xi's position will be securer, and he will be unlikelier to make Taiwan any concessions. Beijing may keep taking measures to reduce further Taiwan's diplomatic latitude. If Tsai and the DPP misjudge the situation now, cross-strait relations may badly suffer, and the people of Taiwan may have to pay a heavy price.

蔡英文的三新主張 難融兩岸關係堅冰

今天是世界衛生大會（WHA）的網上報名截止期，台灣仍未收到大會邀請函，獲邀出席機會很微。而本月20日將上任滿一年的蔡英文總統，上周提出兩岸間「新情勢、新問卷、新模式」主張時，曾將台灣能否獲邀出席今年的世衛大會當作一個重要指標，稱若此事沒有好好處理，「會讓兩岸關係受到一定程度的傷害」。五二○之後的兩岸關係走勢，再度引人注目。但無論蔡英文搬出台灣民意共識也好，自詡釋出善意也好，只要她繼續迴避「九二共識」，兩岸關係的堅冰就很難打破。

蔡英文所謂「新情勢」語焉不詳，但民進黨與北京對此也有不同的觀點。然而民進黨政府沾沾自喜於執政一年來經濟數據比馬英九執政末期時亮麗，民調對蔡英文維持現狀的兩岸政策支持率有五六成，並以此作為與大陸周旋的有力籌碼。但北京卻看到蔡英文上台以來，從年金改革，到勞工假期一例一休，再到同性婚姻合法化進程，在社會上引發連串風波，無不充滿爭議。最新的滿意度調查顯示，認為經濟不好的台灣民眾達八成，約有六成「年輕世代」不滿意蔡英文政府的整體表現，顯示蔡英文的政策，離年輕世代愈來愈遠。

在國際與地區形勢方面，蔡英文或許看到美國新總統特朗普對華強硬的一面，也看到北京近期高度配合美國解決朝核問題的取態，或許認為習近平受困於中共十九大等內部事務，現時無意激化周邊局勢，時局對台有利。

但是，蔡英文可能忽略了特朗普政策的多變性以及其善作交易的商人本質。現時美方恰恰在朝核問題上有求於中方，因此在多個國際問題上對北京放軟手腳，特朗普表態拒絕再與蔡英文通電話，就是顯例。

中共十九大確是習近平今年頭號要務，台灣問題並非當務之急，但統一大業關乎其歷史定位，習近平不太可能在「九二共識」這一底線上有絲毫鬆動。大陸的對台政策，早已由胡錦濤時代的「寄希望於台灣人民」變成「絕不允許任何人以任何形式、任何名義把台灣從祖國分裂出去」。十九大以後，習近平地位更形鞏固，對台讓步的可能性更小，進一步壓縮台灣外交空間的動作可能陸續有來，而蔡英文和民進黨此時若誤判情勢，台灣人民和兩岸關係未來可能要付出重大代價。