城市建設縱亮麗 軟件滯後釀災難

<轉載自2015年8月18日 明報 社評>

天津濱海新區特大爆炸事故，在北京中央強力介入之下，亂象得到梳理，相信災害範圍會受到控制。不過，事故暴露天津在城市規劃與應對災害、危機處理等要求，與現代社會相去甚遠。內地不少城市，近年建設突飛猛進，外觀富麗堂皇，但是被認為城市管理需要的軟件卻嚴重滯後，這在今次爆炸再一次顯現出來。城市缺乏現代社會規劃和管理要求，若結合貪污腐敗等人為因素，則民衆完全有可能陷身各種各樣的風險之中，性命財產安全難以得到合理和足夠保障。

危險倉毗鄰民居 安全管理不到位

濱海新區爆炸最使人不解之處，是偌大一個危險品倉庫在儲存和處理大量危險品，可是其周遭卻有多個居民小區，居住約5600戶居民。任何城市佈局都會把危險品遠離民居，此乃規劃的基本要求。事實上，內地也有規定危險品設施需距離民居最少1000米，但是今次爆炸顯示倉庫與民居的距離並不符合規定。究竟是小區先興建，抑或倉庫先坐落，連日來出現不同說法，而且都有根有據；可是距離不足，無論哪個先哪個後，都避免不了規劃錯誤的事實。

現代城市人口密集，土地資源珍貴，經常因為條件所限，危險品未能遠離民居。在現代社會，危險品的生產和使用又與經濟活動息息相關，所以在維持足夠距離的情况下，危險品與民居共存，被認為是可接受的安排。即使如此，危險品儲存多少，須有明確規限，確保一旦發生意外，對周遭居民不致構成致命影響。今次爆炸威力猛烈程度，說明涉及危險品數量極其龐大，涉事公司竟然獲批准在那裏處理危險品，若非在數量上違規，就是當局疏忽，未顧及一旦有事對附近居民的影響。

涉事危險倉究竟儲存了哪些化學品？數量多少？大爆炸第六天，當局仍然未能交代。前日總理李克強親自到災場，指示不應隱瞞、須如實交代之後，官方才披露和確認有700多噸劇毒氰化鈉（山埃）。由此反映涉及爆炸的危險品種類和數量，是當局沒掌握抑或有隱瞞，尚待釐清。

按目前已知資料，就危險倉選址規劃與儲存量規定或監管，肯定出了問題。這類危險倉理應有一套詳細應急方案，發生某一類事故就啟動哪一個應變步驟；為了應付萬一，倉庫要定期演練，與消防當局保持緊密聯繫，甚至舉行聯合演練，提高應對事故的協作能力。現在，涉事危險倉是否有緊急預案和演練卻無從知曉，當地消防單位對這個倉庫似乎也認識不深、了解不多。

今次爆炸肇因，當局仍未有公布。據爆炸之後流傳的信息提及，懷疑消防員用了錯誤方法撲救，因為有些化學品着火了須用泥沙掩埋或化學泡沫噴射，不能噴水撲救；若倉庫與消防當局緊密聯繫，知道儲存了什麼危險品，而且有定期聯合演練，則消防員自然會用正確方法處理。從大批消防員先後馳抵現場，在爆炸中釀成重大傷亡，消防當局對涉事倉庫所知不多，以至未能正確處理的可能性較高。可以說，倉庫整體安全設計與管理，未符合科學和管理要求。

至於天津當局應對事故的危機管理，與管理大城市應有的水平存在落差。首先，分管安全事務的副市長在爆炸第六日才公開露臉，在記者會上講述過去數日自己與各方制訂方案應對危機；此一說法，由於並無佐證，只能姑妄言之，姑妄聽之。其次，過去數日，出席記者會的官員在回答提問時經常顧左右而言他，有時候甚至乾脆說「不了解、不知道」。大爆炸之後空氣刺鼻，是否化學品燃燒後釋出毒氣，需要官方權威說法並帶領民衆認識和應對，但是天津官員自我隱藏以至在狀况外，民衆怎樣研判自身安危？這樣的環境，是坊間小道消息傳播和謠言的溫牀。

災難資訊不透明 謠言四起惹恐慌

大災難影響民衆性命財產安全，此際官方信息發布十分重要，讓民衆知所因應，不致恐慌。2008年汶川大地震，當時官方容許傳媒較自由採訪報道，地震的破壞和災民狀况得以如實呈現出來，透過傳媒使國人有共同認知，凝聚成一股向心力，在人民群衆之間的心理和行動上都起到一方有難、八方支援的效果。今次天津大爆炸，官民隔閡，民衆對自身處境無從判斷，以致一定程度出現恐慌狀况，直到李克強指示須公開透明、權威充分地發布相關信息，及時回應社會關切，天津當局才改變做法。事實上，資訊稍為透明之後，民衆對空氣質素較踏實，恐慌也會一掃而空。事態說明在危機之中，信息公開透明只有正面積極作用，並無負面消極影響。

今次天津濱海區危險品倉庫大爆炸，從已知資料，反映規劃、安全管理與危機管理都有問題，或未到位。這說明濱海區在硬件建設成績亮麗，但是軟件配套嚴重滯後，而按中國國情，軟件短板經常與貪污腐敗有關。涉事倉庫有消息說與天津個別高官家人扯上關係，且看事態發展；李克強已經表明事故涉及的失職瀆職和違法違規行為，一定徹查究責，最高人民檢察院介入調查，此事牽出怎樣的天津官場景象，民衆拭目以待。天津這類軟件短板而釀成的大災難，在全國各處城市還隱藏着多少類似危機，同樣是使人忐忑不安的憂慮。

The Achilles' heel of China's magnificent cities

THE MASSIVE EXPLOSION in the Binhai New Area of Tianjin shows unmistakably that, with respect to urban planning and disaster and crisis management, the city falls far short of the requirements of a modern metropolis. Many cities in mainland China have through grand construction projects developed rapidly in recent years and look magnificent. However, it is generally felt that they have failed dismally to develop the corresponding "software" necessary for urban management. The Tianjin explosion is just another illustration of this reality.

What is utterly incomprehensible is why so huge a warehouse for storing and handling huge quantities of dangerous goods could have been built in the neighbourhood of 5,600 households. Any qualified urban planner would have dangerous goods kept far away from residential areas, which is a basic principle in urban planning.

Given their high population densities and limited land resources, modern cities often have difficulty keeping dangerous goods far away from residential areas, labouring as they do under their physical constraints. Still, the quantity of dangerous goods allowed should be clearly regulated so that, in case of an accident, nothing fatal should happen to those living nearby. Judging by the violence of the Tianjin explosion, there were clearly huge quantities of dangerous goods. The company concerned should not have been allowed to handle them in the vicinity of a residential area. If the company had not violated the relevant regulations, the authorities must have neglected their duties.

What chemicals and what quantities of them were stored in that dangerous warehouse? Six days after the explosion, the authorities were still unable to answer this question. The day before yesterday, Premier Li Keqiang visited the site of the explosion and gave instructions that nothing should be hidden, and that the truth must be told. It was only then that the officials disclosed and confirmed that there were more than 700 tonnes of deadly sodium cyanide in the warehouse.

Dangerous warehouses should have a detailed emergency plan in place, and keep in close touch with fire departments. Reports circulated after the explosion claim that the firefighters seemed to have made a mistake in their attempt to put out the fire, for some chemical fires should not be sprayed with water, but should be smothered with sand or chemical foam. If the warehouse had been in close touch with the fire department, the firefighters would have known what dangerous goods there were and how to deal with them properly.

In their management of the crisis, the Tianjin authorities have failed to rise to the challenge of running a big city. First, the deputy mayor in charge of safety did not make an appearance until the sixth day after the explosion - he said at a press conference that he had been engaged in developing, in conjunction with the parties concerned, a plan to combat the crisis. Second, at press conferences in the first few days, officials tended to dodge questions and sometimes they simply asserted that they did not have the information required, or that they did not know. This has helped to breed unconfirmed news and rumours.

As official information was not forthcoming, the public was unable to judge the situation and there was a certain degree of panic after the explosion. It was not until Li ordered the open and transparent disclosure of authoritative information that the Tianjin authorities changed their way of doing things. Clearly, in managing a crisis, the open and transparent disclosure of information is always helpful and in no way undesirable.

城市建設縱亮麗 軟件滯後釀災難

天津濱海新區特大爆炸事故，暴露天津在城市規劃與應對災害、危機處理等要求，與現代社會相去甚遠。內地不少城市，近年建設突飛猛進，外觀富麗堂皇，但是被認為城市管理需要的軟件卻嚴重滯後，這在今次爆炸再一次顯現出來。

濱海新區爆炸最使人不解之處，是偌大一個危險品倉庫在儲存和處理大量危險品，可是其周遭卻有約5600戶居民。任何城市佈局都會把危險品遠離民居，此乃規劃的基本要求。

現代城市人口密集，土地資源珍貴，經常因為條件所限，危險品未能遠離民居。即使如此，危險品儲存多少，須有明確規限，確保一旦發生意外，對周遭居民不致構成致命影響。今次爆炸威力猛烈程度，說明涉及危險品數量極其龐大，涉事公司竟然獲批准在那裏處理危險品，若非在數量上違規，就是當局疏忽。

涉事危險倉究竟儲存了哪些化學品？數量多少？大爆炸第六天，當局仍然未能交代。前日總理李克強親自到災場，指示不應隱瞞、須如實交代之後，官方才披露和確認有700多噸劇毒氰化鈉（山埃）。

危險倉理應有一套詳細應急方案，與消防當局保持緊密聯繫。據爆炸之後流傳的信息提及，懷疑消防員用了錯誤方法撲救，因為有些化學品着火了須用泥沙掩埋或化學泡沫噴射，不能噴水撲救；若倉庫與消防當局緊密聯繫，知道儲存了什麼危險品，則消防員自然會用正確方法處理。

至於天津當局應對事故的危機管理，與管理大城市應有的水平存在落差。首先，分管安全事務的副市長在爆炸第六日才公開露臉，在記者會上講述過去數日自己與各方制訂方案應對危機。其次，過去數日，出席記者會的官員在回答提問時經常顧左右而言他，有時候甚至乾脆說「不了解、不知道」。這樣的環境，是坊間小道消息傳播和謠言的溫牀。

今次天津大爆炸，官民隔閡，民衆對自身處境無從判斷，以致一定程度出現恐慌狀况，直到李克強指示須公開透明、權威充分地發布相關信息，天津當局才改變做法。事態說明在危機之中，信息公開透明只有正面積極作用，並無負面消極影響。