蔡英文拒「九二共識」 兩岸缺互信陷冷對抗

<轉載自2016年10月11日 明報 社評>

台灣蔡英文總統在「雙十慶典」的演說，顯示她堅持不接受「九二共識」。兩岸在缺乏政治基礎和互信下，未來關係難以預測，可預見情况會由 5．20之後的「冷和平」轉向「冷對抗」發展。至於會否進一步惡化，須視乎島內台獨勢力會否施壓要求急獨，以至區域情勢的演變，都會起到牽動作用。

小英說什麼都可談 國台辦質疑其善意

蔡英文堅拒承認「九二共識」，不接受「兩岸同屬一個中國」的核心意涵。不過，她在「雙十演說」提出「兩岸之間應該盡快坐下來談」、「什麼都可以談」，又向習近平喊話，期望「兩岸領導人應共同展現智慧和彈性，將兩岸帶回到理性、冷靜的態度，一起把兩岸現存的分歧帶向雙贏的未來」，云云。5．20之後，大陸基於兩岸缺乏政治基礎，中止了國台辦與陸委會、海協會與海基會的機制運作，台灣當然希望恢復溝通聯繫，以體現蔡英文的「維持現狀不變」。

從大陸的角度，當兩岸再坐下來，則談判的對手是誰？是認同「一個中國」的兩岸政府，抑或是推動台獨的蔡英文當局？另外所謂「什麼都可以談」，則談什麼呢？談統一、談台獨？按目前的認知理解都不可能。因此，蔡英文就兩岸的最新取態，可以說仍然虛空，並無實處。從國台辦發言人重申「『九二共識』及其體現的一個中國原則」的重要性，質疑蔡英文所謂的「善意」，看不到兩岸會因為這篇演說而恢復溝通協商。

近期，蔡英文分別接受美國和日本傳媒訪問，都傳達着她要「建立具一致性、可預測、且可持續的兩岸關係」的信息。所謂一致性可以理解，因為只要蔡英文不調整立場，就是一致了；不過，按她的取態立場，除非是指兩岸關係將持續轉壞，否則就很難理解蔡英文怎樣判斷兩岸關係的可預測和可持續。即使兩岸關係繼續僵持，蔡英文透過近期操作，仍然可取得政治利益，因為對於島內台獨勢力、對於她倚賴的美國和日本的支持，都有所交代了，只是客觀上兩岸關係更陷低迷而已。

蔡英文已經確定的兩岸立場，可歸結為「四不一沒有」；「四不」即是現狀不變、善意不變、不會屈服、不會對抗，而她始終不宣之於口的「一沒有」，就是「沒有九二共識」。16年前，陳水扁就職總統之時，同樣喊出「四不一沒有」，當時第一個「不」更是「不會宣布獨立」。其後，陳水扁搞烽火外交、推動台灣加入聯合國、公投制憲等法理台獨的嘗試，招致美國指他為「麻煩製造者」，是另一回事了。蔡英文大概汲取了陳水扁的教訓，從選前到美國訪問時，承諾「維持現狀不變」而取得美國支持，她迄今就此規行矩步，並未搞出美國不能接受的狀况，也不給予大陸打壓的口實。不過，隨着施政開局失利，蔡英文民望下滑，而激進台獨勢力步步進逼，近期她的取態被認為已經向「深綠」靠攏。蔡英文是否肯定不會走陳水扁的老路？目前仍然難以定論。

切斷兩岸連繫紐帶 客觀使台灣更割離

5．20之後，兩岸互動急速冷卻，大陸旅客赴台大幅減少，衝擊島內旅遊業，不單業界叫苦，也影響台灣經濟，蔡英文當局就此承受不少壓力。不過，即使現况看不到轉機，島內台獨勢力卻有不少人暗中叫好。他們的邏輯是上世紀80年代中期，開放民衆到大陸探親和陸續「三通」之前，兩岸從政治、經濟、社會等各方面並無往來，卻無礙台灣發展，更創造了經濟奇蹟。台獨勢力認為大陸旅客不來，甚至是其他雙邊連繫中斷也沒有什麼大不了；起初需要調適和咬緊牙關撑過去，只要台灣重新建立起與其他國家和地方的連繫，減少倚賴大陸，屆時台灣將更「獨立」於大陸以外。

台灣切斷與大陸連繫的轉型，會否如台獨勢力的主觀願望，尚待事態發展。總之，他們之中有很多人是那樣體待大陸與台灣關係的消長。事實上， 5．20以來，蔡英文統率民進黨政府處理兩岸關係，包括政治上與大陸對抗、經濟上與大陸疏遠、文化上與大陸脫鈎，漸趨明顯；在美國和日本幕後支持下，這條路線可以走多遠，還須視乎大陸如何對應。兩岸將會出現的「冷對抗」以什麼形態體現，尚待觀察；設若大陸就台灣現况採取的舉措，客觀上起着切斷連繫紐帶的效果，變得兩岸不相往來，會否使台灣更實質地割離，值得大陸當局思考。

Tsai's refusal to acknowledge 1992 Consensus

IN her speech for the Double Tenth Day, Tsai Eng-wen, the Taiwanese President, displayed her steadfast refusal to accept the "1992 Consensus". As governments across the Taiwan Strait lack political common ground and mutual trust, it is difficult to predict what their relations will become. What is foreseeable, however, is that their relations will evolve from the "cold peace" since May 20 to "cold confrontation". Whether the situation will further deteriorate hinges on whether the Taiwanese independence movement will press for a prompt independence, with the developments in the region also decisive.

Tsai's stubborn refusal to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus is tantamount to a refusal to embrace the core concept that "the two regions across the strait belong to one China". However, in her speech for the Double Tenth day, she did suggest that "governments across the Taiwan Strait should sit down and talk as soon as possible", adding that "anything can be discussed". She also called on Xi Jinping to respond to her, saying that she "expects leaders from across the strait to display their collective wisdom and flexibility, return cross-strait relations to rationality and calmness, and work together to transform the existing disagreements across the strait into a win-win situation". After May 20, due to a lack of political common ground, the mainland government ceased interactions under the existing mechanism between the Taiwan Affairs Office and Mainland Affairs Council, and those between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and the Straits Exchange Foundation. No doubt the Taiwanese government wants to restore these communications to maintain the status quo proposed by Tsai.

From mainland China's vantage point, if governments across the Taiwan Strait "sit down and talk", who will be on the other side of the negotiation table? A government that acknowledges the "one China" principle, or the Tsai administration which is pushing ahead with Taiwan's independence? Furthermore, if "anything can be discussed", then what should be discussed, the unification of China or Taiwan's independence? As far as we understand, neither is possible at the moment. Furthermore, Tsai's latest stance on the cross-strait issue is vague at best and lacks substance. As the spokesperson of the Taiwan Affairs Office has reiterated the importance of the 1992 Consensus and the "one China" principle enshrined in the consensus and challenged the so-called "good intentions" of Tsai, we do not see how the governments across the strait can restore communications and negotiations simply because of Tsai's speech.

Recently, in her interviews to the American and Japanese media, Tsai has invariably delivered the message of "fostering a cross-strait relationship that is coherent, predictable and sustainable". The so-called "coherence" is comprehensible — as long as Tsai does not shift her stance, the relationship can be said to be coherent. However, given the stance she has taken, unless what she means is the continued deterioration of cross-strait relations, it will be very difficult to understand what she means by "predictability" and "sustainability" of cross-strait relations. Even if cross-strait relations remain as uneasy as they are, Tsai has been able to gain political advantages through her recent manoeuvres, since she has given a response to the pro-independence movement in Taiwan as well as the United States and Japan, on whose support she is reliant. The only problem is that she has strained cross-strait relations further.

It remains to be seen how the "cold confrontation" will manifest itself. If the mainland authorities respond to the situation in Taiwan in such a way that has the effect of severing the connections across the strait and leading to estrangement between the two regions, it will deserve the thought of the mainland authorities whether that will make Taiwan more distant in reality.

蔡英文拒「九二共識」 兩岸缺互信陷冷對抗

台灣蔡英文總統在「雙十慶典」的演說，顯示她堅持不接受「九二共識」。兩岸在缺乏政治基礎和互信下，未來關係難以預測，可預見情况會由 5．20之後的「冷和平」轉向「冷對抗」發展。至於會否進一步惡化，須視乎島內台獨勢力會否施壓要求急獨，以至區域情勢的演變，都會起到牽動作用。

蔡英文堅拒承認「九二共識」，不接受「兩岸同屬一個中國」的核心意涵。不過，她在「雙十演說」提出「兩岸之間應該盡快坐下來談」、「什麼都可以談」，又向習近平喊話，期望「兩岸領導人應共同展現智慧和彈性，將兩岸帶回到理性、冷靜的態度，一起把兩岸現存的分歧帶向雙贏的未來」，云云。5．20之後，大陸基於兩岸缺乏政治基礎，中止了國台辦與陸委會、海協會與海基會的機制運作，台灣當然希望恢復溝通聯繫，以體現蔡英文的「維持現狀不變」。

從大陸的角度，當兩岸再坐下來，則談判的對手是誰？是認同「一個中國」的兩岸政府，抑或是推動台獨的蔡英文當局？另外所謂「什麼都可以談」，則談什麼呢？談統一、談台獨？按目前的認知理解都不可能。因此，蔡英文就兩岸的最新取態，可以說仍然虛空，並無實處。從國台辦發言人重申「『九二共識』及其體現的一個中國原則」的重要性，質疑蔡英文所謂的「善意」，看不到兩岸會因為這篇演說而恢復溝通協商。

近期，蔡英文分別接受美國和日本傳媒訪問，都傳達着她要「建立具一致性、可預測、且可持續的兩岸關係」的信息。所謂一致性可以理解，因為只要蔡英文不調整立場，就是一致了；不過，按她的取態立場，除非是指兩岸關係將持續轉壞，否則就很難理解蔡英文怎樣判斷兩岸關係的可預測和可持續。即使兩岸關係繼續僵持，蔡英文透過近期操作，仍然可取得政治利益，因為對於島內台獨勢力、對於她倚賴的美國和日本的支持，都有所交代了，只是客觀上兩岸關係更陷低迷而已。

兩岸將會出現的「冷對抗」以什麼形態體現，尚待觀察；設若大陸就台灣現况採取的舉措，客觀上起着切斷連繫紐帶的效果，變得兩岸不相往來，會否使台灣更實質地割離，值得大陸當局思考。