陸停自由行對台示警 後續影響恐超越選舉

<轉載自2019年8月5日 明報 社評>

大陸官方宣布，「鑑於當前兩岸關係」，決定自8月1日起暫停47個城市大陸居民赴台個人遊（自由行）試點。由於目前大陸赴台自由行試點只限這47城市，實際上等於暫停了全大陸所有赴台自由行，這是自試點2011年開始以來首度叫停，由於目前大陸不少台灣團實際上也是由散客自組而成，因此陸客數目勢必大減，這對台灣觀光業者猶如晴天霹靂。雖然此舉被視作對台灣2020年總統立委二合一大選的介入動作，也有解讀為對台灣高調介入香港反修例的報復，但今次的動作與以往不同之處，反映了北京對台思維的轉變，影響範圍恐不限於2020年大選，後續會否有其他動作出台，對香港有何連帶影響，值得關注。

與以往選前限制不同 或屬窮台戰略一部分

與馬英九執政時陸客高峰時一年赴台400萬人次相比，蔡英文上台後陸客人數已經大減。據大陸統計，2018年赴台陸客約269.6萬人次，比2017年減少1.35%，其中自由行旅客107萬人次。以本月到明年1月大選約半年計，台灣旅遊業者估計自由行陸客會減少約70萬，經濟損失約新台幣200億元，消息公布翌日，台灣觀光類酒店業股的股價應聲下挫。台灣內政部評估，大陸停發簽注效應，最快到第四季或明年首季才會顯現，以陸客每月來台自由行10萬人次（業界估計是15萬人次）估算，對台灣經濟增長率的影響僅0.1個百分點。

叫停自由行對台灣整體經濟損失或許不大，但值得注意的是北京這項動作傳達的信息。過去台灣選舉前，大陸也會低調減少赴台遊客，惟今次卻首次正式發布官方公告，顯然是希望擴散信息，引起關注，達到警示效果。

在官方公告中，開首明言是「鑑於當前兩岸關係」，直接表達對台灣當局的不滿。似乎生怕外人看不懂，國台辦發言人馬曉光翌日再評論稱，大陸居民赴台自由行試點，是在兩岸關係和平發展大背景下啟動。他指摘民進黨當局不斷推進「台獨」，煽動對大陸敵意，挑動兩岸對立，嚴重破壞自由行試點的基礎和條件，又表示兩岸同胞都希望兩岸關係早日回到和平發展正確軌道上來，陸客赴台旅遊能盡快回復正常、健康局面。言下之意，只要兩岸關係未得改善，陸客自由行就不會恢復。

以往北京在台灣選前縮減陸客，多於投票前3個月時實施，目前距台灣明年1月11日大選投票日還有半年，預示這次大陸減少赴台遊客的目的似有所不同。而且過去減少的多是旅行團，今次則對自由行散客開刀。有分析認為，此舉不像是應對選舉的臨時措施，而是「窮台戰略」的一部分，減少散客對台灣的旅遊業者與中南部鄉村衝擊相對較小，打擊面較小。不排除叫停自由行只是對台經濟施壓的第一步，後續可能還會有舉措出台。在兩岸經貿往來中，台方去年有800億美元順差，若失去大陸市場，台灣的國際收支即變赤字。

台灣總統蔡英文批評大陸此舉是「戰略上很大的錯誤」，又說觀光不應被政治化，說明她深知北京此舉的針對意味。在當今世界，貿易制裁固然是雙刃劍，卻愈來愈常被用作政治武器，從美國制裁中興、華為，到日本制裁韓國，這類「殺敵一千，自損八百」的焦土政策，屢見不鮮。從威脅要對美企設「不可靠實體清單」，到宣布制裁對台軍售的美企看，北京也傾向走令對手畏威的路線。

京對台思維跳脫窠臼 港台來往恐再受限縮

過去，每到台灣選舉前，大陸都盡量避免出台激烈的對台舉措，以免被民進黨「撿到槍」炒作，但今次不僅高調叫停赴台自由行，解放軍更在台海大規模軍演，顯示北京對台政策已跳脫被台灣選舉綑綁的窠臼，不再懼怕對民進黨有利，由寄希望於台灣人民，變成以我為主。經過近年的島內形勢演變，大陸對和平統一台灣的前景日趨幻滅，對於藍綠誰人上台，已經沒有以往那麼在意。

島內的選戰會否因大陸的這種介入生變仍難逆料，但現在看來，在藍綠勢均力敵的較量中，以台北市長柯文哲代表的白色力量下月若加入戰團，恐怕對蔡英文的威脅更大一些。但無論如何，2020年台灣的大選，都不同於以往，將會是影響兩岸關係未來5到10年的重要分水嶺。

長期以來，香港既是兩岸交往的紐帶，又是兩岸角力的戰場。因兩岸關係改善，前幾年港台關係也升溫，台灣駐港機構得以正名，香港亦開設駐台機構，兩地交往空前密切。隨着兩岸關係低迷，港台關係也受影響，特別是今次反修例風波，因涉台案件而起，台方高調介入，已觸碰北京眼中「紅線」，後續對港台官方關係會產生何種影響，值得高度關注。在台北有人提議修訂《港澳關係條例》以制裁港警和官員的氣氛下，港台兩地人員來往會否再受限縮，雙方派駐人員會否重演港英時期遭驅逐的情况，令人十分憂心。

Mainland's suspension of individual tourism permits for Taiwan

The mainland authorities have announced that, "in view of current cross-strait relations", they have decided to suspend the trial run of a scheme under which residents from 47 mainland cities can visit Taiwan as individual tourists effective from 1 August.

The number of mainland visitors to Taiwan during Ma Ying-jeou's presidency reached a peak of four million a year. The figure has fallen sharply since Tsai Ing-wen assumed office. According to statistics from the mainland government, around 2.696 million mainlanders visited Taiwan in 2018, 1.07 million of them individual visitors. That was 1.35 percent down from the 2017 figure. People in Taiwan's tourist industry estimate that, during the period between this month and the elections next January, roughly half a year in length, the number of individual visitors from the mainland will fall by around 700 thousand, resulting in economic loss of around 20 billion New Taiwan dollars. The day after the mainland government's announcement, the shares of companies in Taiwan's tourist and hotel industries tumbled. Taiwan's Ministry of the Interior estimates that the effects of the mainland's move will not surface until the fourth quarter of this year or the first quarter of next year at the earliest. Based on the estimate that 100 thousand mainlanders visit Taiwan on individual tours every month (the industry's estimate is 150 thousand), the move will affect Taiwan's economic growth by just 0.1 percentage points.

In the past, the mainland authorities would avoid introducing provocative measures against Taiwan before elections so as not to provide fodder for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This time around, not only have the mainland authorities called off the individual visit scheme to Taiwan in a high-profile manner, but the People's Liberation Army has even staged a large-scale military exercise in the Taiwan Strait. This shows that Beijing's policy towards Taiwan is no longer hamstrung by elections in Taiwan as before. It no longer baulks at a policy that benefits the DPP. In the past, Beijing pinned its hopes on the Taiwanese people, but now its policies are Beijing-oriented. Following the changes in the situation in Taiwan over the past few years, the mainland authorities' hope of peaceful reunification with Taiwan has vanished. Compared with the past, they now care much less about which camp - the blue camp or the green camp - and who will come to power.

It is hard to predict how such intervention by the Beijing authorities will change the dynamics of elections in Taiwan. But as things stand, the blue and green camps are on a par with each other. The white camp represented by Ko Wen-je, the mayor of Taipei, might constitute a greater threat to Tsai if it joins the fray next month. No matter what happens, Taiwan's elections in 2020 will be different from those in the past. They will mark a watershed moment that affects cross-strait relations over the next five to ten years.

For a long period of time, Hong Kong has been a link enabling interactions between both sides of the strait and a battleground for both sides' rivalry. Several years ago, owing to improvement in cross-strait relations, the relationship between Hong Kong and Taiwan also blossomed. Taiwan's agencies in Hong Kong had their names rectified, while Hong Kong also established agencies in Taiwan. Interactions between the two regions were unprecedentedly frequent. However, as cross-strait relations have hit a low, the relationship between Hong Kong and Taiwan has also been affected. The protests against proposed amendments to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance, originated from a criminal case involving Taiwan. The high-profile intervention of Taiwan has threatened the "red lines" of the Beijing government. It deserves high level of attention how the ramifications of the incident will affect the official relationship between Hong Kong and Taiwan. In Taipei, there are suggestions that the Act Governing Relations with Hong Kong and Macau be amended so as to impose sanctions on Hong Kong police and government officials. With such an atmosphere, it is deeply worrying whether interactions between people in Hong Kong and Taiwan will be further limited and whether officials accredited by both sides will be expelled in a repetition of what happened during the British colonial era.

陸停自由行對台示警 後續影響恐超越選舉

大陸官方宣布，「鑑於當前兩岸關係」，決定自8月1日起暫停47個城市大陸居民赴台個人遊（自由行）試點。

與馬英九執政時陸客高峰時一年赴台400萬人次相比，蔡英文上台後陸客人數已經大減。據大陸統計，2018年赴台陸客約269.6萬人次，比2017年減少1.35%，其中自由行旅客107萬人次。以本月到明年1月大選約半年計，台灣旅遊業者估計自由行陸客會減少約70萬，經濟損失約新台幣200億元，消息公布翌日，台灣觀光類酒店業股的股價應聲下挫。台灣內政部評估，大陸停發簽注效應，最快到第四季或明年首季才會顯現，以陸客每月來台自由行10萬人次（業界估計是15萬人次）估算，對台灣經濟增長率的影響僅0.1個百分點。

過去，每到台灣選舉前，大陸都盡量避免出台激烈的對台舉措，以免被民進黨「撿到槍」炒作，但今次不僅高調叫停赴台自由行，解放軍更在台海大規模軍演，顯示北京對台政策已跳脫被台灣選舉綑綁的窠臼，不再懼怕對民進黨有利，由寄希望於台灣人民，變成以我為主。經過近年的島內形勢演變，大陸對和平統一台灣的前景日趨幻滅，對於藍綠誰人上台，已經沒有以往那麼在意。

島內的選戰會否因大陸的這種介入生變仍難逆料，但現在看來，在藍綠勢均力敵的較量中，以台北市長柯文哲代表的白色力量下月若加入戰團，恐怕對蔡英文的威脅更大一些。但無論如何，2020年台灣的大選，都不同於以往，將會是影響兩岸關係未來5到10年的重要分水嶺。

長期以來，香港既是兩岸交往的紐帶，又是兩岸角力的戰場。因兩岸關係改善，前幾年港台關係也升溫，台灣駐港機構得以正名，香港亦開設駐台機構，兩地交往空前密切。隨着兩岸關係低迷，港台關係也受影響，今次反修例風波，因涉台案件而起，台方高調介入，已觸碰北京眼中「紅線」，後續對港台官方關係會產生何種影響，值得高度關注。在台北有人提議修訂《港澳關係條例》以制裁港警和官員的氣氛下，港台兩地人員來往會否再受限縮，雙方派駐人員會否重演港英時期遭驅逐的情况，令人十分憂心。