日本延長拘留「閩晉漁5179號」船長詹其雄10日至本月29日，說明中國政府循外交施壓，要求日本無條件放人，已經失敗，也顯示日本根本不在乎所謂「損害中日關係大局」。中國政府已經被日本逼入死角，為了國家和人民的尊嚴，中國政府必須顯示不惜與日本斷交的決心，以實際行動營救詹其雄和捍衛釣魚島的領土和主權。
過去這些年，日本艦艇驅趕兩岸漁船既為常態，除非另有蓄謀，否則無法解釋日本為何先扣留「閩晉漁」，接着只放船和船員，但把船長扣押至今。因為事態發展迄今，日本「挾持」詹其雄為「人質」，在政治上已經達到目的，例如確立了以國內法處理與釣魚島相關的案例，但是日本並未「見好即收」；另外，日本刻意不給自己或雙方下台階，例如詹其雄祖母上周三的喪禮、中國人歷來重視一家團聚的中秋節（明日），只要從日本人道主義出發，讓詹其雄回家奔喪或團聚，事態就不會如此鬧得那麼僵。
中日過去爭拗歷史問題 已質變為爭奪海底資源
這次事件破壞中日關係的程度，與拘留詹其雄已經不成比例。所以日本應該有更大圖謀，才能解釋為何堅持要把「閩晉漁」事件小事化大，而爭奪資源和在靠近中國的島嶼駐紮自衛隊，是日本製造這次事端的深層背景。
日本媒體報道，日本政府計劃宣布25個離島「國有化」，以此作為「劃定大陸架面積和確保海底資源的基點」。這些島嶼就包括釣魚島。此一做法，將大大擴張日本的「海洋版圖」，其大陸架面積擴大到447萬平方公里，相當於日本國土面積的11倍；島嶼「國有化」之後，周圍的海域就納入為日本的「專屬經濟區」，要開採這海域內的資源，都必須得到日本許可。另外，相伴而來是日本要在這些島嶼駐軍，日本傳媒已報道，日本計劃38年來首次擴編陸上自衛隊，由現時的15.5萬人擴充到16.8萬人，所增加1.3萬人，全部分配到包括釣魚島在內的所謂「西南諸島」。
放在這個背景之下，日本蓄意延長拘留詹其雄，甚至把中日關係也押上的真正意圖就浮現出來了。就釣魚島而言，這是日本由低調控制走向法理擁有的步驟；就與中國爭奪海底資源而言，這是為日本擴軍、在靠近中國的島嶼駐軍，鋪墊法理依據。
對於中國政府，其實保衛釣魚島已經迫在眉睫。日後當日本正式宣布把釣魚島「國有化」之時，中國怎樣對應？難道又是口頭發表「釣魚島是中國固有領土」、「中國神聖領土不可侵犯」而已？中國單方面「顧全中日關係大局」之時，日本傳媒報道今年12月，日本和美國將在「西南諸島」舉行大規模「奪島」演習，目的明顯針對釣魚島。可見，日本已經作了最壞打算，就是若中國搶先登陸釣魚島，日本將會同美國以軍事行動奪回。
日本對於釣魚島主權爭議，根本不打算搞什麼訴諸國際正義，而是準備與美國一起，對中國打一場局部的島嶼戰爭。今年5月，日本已經通知台灣當局，決定把日本最西端的與那國島上空的台日防空識別區界線，擴大至該島外海較靠近台灣一側的上空。日本這項修改，實質是擴大了領空範圍，同時壓縮了台灣防空識別區的空間。種種迹象顯示日本已經策劃以軍事部署和準備軍事行動，擴大海洋版圖以爭奪海底資源，「佔領」釣魚島只是整個大圖謀的其中一點。
從這個背景，折射出「閩晉漁」事件發生以來，中國外交部雖云6次召見日本駐華大使，但是效果甚微，而日本延長拘留詹其雄之後，中國政府宣布的3項反擊措施﹕暫停省部級以上交往；中止增加航班、擴大航權事宜商談；推遲中日煤炭綜合會議等。這3項措施，當然對日本不利，但是這類「制裁」也是雙刃劍，日本可能有損失，中國也不能說並無負面影響。不過，與日本的大圖謀比較，日本會輕易就此讓步？看來可能性不大。
中國與日本的分歧，已經質變。過去，中日經常就日本首相參拜靖國神社、篡改教科書、是否有南京大屠殺等歷史問題爭拗，基本上這是虛的；但是，日本悄然改變分歧的本質，與中國爭奪戰略資源，這是現實利益的爭逐。從已知事態看來，日本在新階段爭逐處於優勢，並已取得主動權和話語權。中國當局是否意識到或認識到情况改變，已經做好了準備？身為炎黃子孫，看到近期中日互動的情况，我們有理由深以為憂。
官民應該聯手保釣「火燒趙家樓」值得殷鑑
無論日本有多大圖謀，釣魚島仍然關鍵。現階段中國政府不應該再壓制中國人民的保釣行動，如有人民自發到釣魚島宣示主權，中國政府還應該派出艦艇護航，要有在釣魚島海域與日本軍艦對峙的準備，只有中國以實際行動宣示擁有釣魚島主權，才可以打破日本對釣魚島予取予攜的困局。
這次「閩晉漁事件」，日本當局蔑視中國和中國人的心態，表露無遺。中國政府若不帶領人民保衛釣魚島，日本正式「佔領」釣魚島之日，中國人民的怒火會燒向哪一方？第一次世界大戰後舉行的巴黎和會，列強恣意踐踏中國主權，當時中國的北洋政府未能捍衛國家利益，在列強面前顯得軟弱，使國人異常不滿，從而上街遊行表達憤慨。1919年的5月4日，北京高校3000名學生代表衝破軍警阻撓，雲集天安門，然後遊行到交通總長曹汝霖的住宅，火燒曹宅，是為「火燒趙家樓」事件。這段歷史，值得現在的中國政府殷鑑。
Access to spot news information
THE police force renewed the Command
and Control Communications System it had used for years towards the end of
2004. As they can no longer tune into police communications, spot news
reporters can no longer rush to the scene. When it did so, Commission of Police
Dick Lee (as he then was) repeatedly urged the media to trust him, vowing that,
despite the new arrangement, the force was willing to continue to work with the
media. It is a shame that this pledge has yet to be effectively carried out.
The Hong Kong Journalists
Association (HKJA) released a report on the issue on September 12. It says
that, in the second half of 2009, the police released on average only 2.7 items
of such information, or only 1.27% of the reported crimes. Only 20% of the
items were released less than 20 minutes after the incidents had happened.
Information on some of the cases was released more than four hours after they
had arisen.
According to the HKJA, Alfred Ma,
who was chief superintendent that headed the Police Public Relations Branch,
estimated the police would release a hundred items a day. The management of the
force did aim at disseminating between 30 and 40 items a day. In fact, in the
second half of 2009, it released only 2.7 items a day on average and, on nine
of the days, it sent out no items at all.
An incident that seems unimportant
or insignificant may have much bearing on the public interest. It is
undesirable for the force to decide unilaterally whether any item is
newsworthy. Hong Kong Island saw a minor road incident that involved a tram in
October, 1997. It seemed too minor to be of much interest to the public.
However, in covering it, our reporters discovered that tram drivers had no
lunch breaks. Many trams drivers had to eat their box lunches while they were
at the wheel. Our story about that raised a public outcry and triggered tram
drivers' campaign to fight for their reasonable breaks. They were eventually
allowed reasonable lunch breaks. That has helped improve passenger safety.
Furthermore, when they gathered spot
news, reporters often came across police officers that courageously attempted
to save life and limb. Stories about them would certainly have helped raise the
force's prestige. Now reporters can no longer rush to the scene, stories about
police officers' valiant deeds are rare. Because it has adopted the new
information dissemination mechanism, the force has lost out too.
The force has told the media that
because it is short-handed, its officers have to deal with large numbers of
cases every day and it has a duty to verify all items of information before
disseminating them, it has yet to meet the quantity and time-lag targets it has
set itself.
If the force has omitted to
disseminate or delayed disseminating any spot news information for no other
reason than its short-handedness, it ought to consider adopting the proposal
media organisations have made. It should set up a website which only local
reporters may visit or designate a room adjacent to the office of its Public
Relations Branch to which only media organisation representatives have access.
It should then allow media organisations free and full access to preliminary
spot news information after deleting personal data. Media organisations can
decide by themselves whether to have their reporters follow up any cases. By
doing so, the force can save on manpower (because it need not have items
screened), promptly disseminate spot news information, protect the privacy of
people involved in criminal cases and ensure the public's right to know.
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