2017年10月16日 星期一

雙十講話軟中帶硬 憲改既為選舉也為獨

<轉載自20171016 明報 社評>

台灣總統蔡英文上周在雙十慶典的講話中,對於兩岸議題並未有所謂的「新論述」,而是重複其「新四不」立場,即「善意不變、承諾不變,不會走回對抗的老路,但也不會在壓力下屈服」,呼籲兩岸尋求「互動新模式」。但她卻用了以往罕見的大篇幅強調「國防軍備」,「強化戰力而不求戰」。給人的印象是有軟有硬,似乎避免給中共十九大及特朗普訪京製造話題。不過,這篇講話似軟還硬,加上島內有關憲政改革的討論漸趨熱烈,對兩岸關係和地區安全的衝擊值得關注。

與去年比有減有增 避提憲法強調備戰

對於蔡英文的「雙十講話」,大陸國台辦的回應是:「台灣當局不論提出什麼模式、主張,關鍵是要說清楚兩岸關係的性質這一根本性問題,確認台灣與大陸同屬一個中國的核心認知。」這一回應未提「九二共識」,民進黨有人竟為此沾沾自喜,但如果大陸對台政策從允許「一中各表」的「九二共識」,變成只剩下更為嚴苛的「一中」,對主張台獨的民進黨來說,真不知何喜之有。

與蔡英文去年首個「雙十講話」對比,「中華民國憲法」、「兩岸人民關係條例」、「九二會談的歷史事實」等詞語,今年都未再提起,連前總統馬英九都指出,如果這是刻意迴避,就「非常嚴重」。蔡在講話中反而罕見地大篇幅強調三軍24小時戰備、準備迎戰等防務話題。這一減一增,向北京傳遞的,很難說是什麼善意。至於她在宣布由親民黨主席宋楚瑜代表台灣出席今年亞太經合組織(APEC)峰會時強調,願在APEC架構之下,與大陸進行善意的互動與合作,云云,聽在堅持兩岸問題不能在國際多邊場合談的北京領導人耳中,更是哭笑不得。

另一邊廂,蔡英文上月在民進黨黨代會拋出憲政改革的議題之後,現於台灣社會引發了熱烈討論。涉及統獨的議題十分敏感,隨時牽動兩岸關係和地區安全的神經。

台灣憲改議題涉及不同層面,相對單純的投票權從20歲降至18歲、各縣因人口多寡導致的「票票不等值」等議題,屬最淺層面的憲改;第二層面的改革則是將目前的「雙首長制」改為「總統制」或「內閣制」;第三層面也是最深層面的改革,就是推動「國家正常化」,即涉及兩岸關係的定位。

由於台灣與大陸分治已長達68年,島內政體的任何變更,即使表面看只是提升效率、擴大民主,實際上都或多或少觸及統獨這根敏感神經。1990年代初的修憲,在廢除「萬年國代」的同時,也切斷了台灣政壇與大陸的連結;1997年的修憲,虛化台灣省政府,將中華民國與台灣合為一體。民進黨獨派大老林濁水就坦言,民進黨推動總統直選「最原始的目的是希望透過總統直選的過程凝聚台灣人民的國家認同」。可見台灣的憲改,並不只是政治制度的改革那麼簡單。

歷次修憲多涉統獨 中美轉勢台難自主

雖然有權謀分析指出,蔡英文的修憲是為2020年連任掃平政治障礙,如果走內閣制的修憲方向,作為民進黨主席,蔡英文可成為修憲後的首任台灣總理,既可打破總統連任的任期限制,又可令無政黨背景的柯文哲陷入要麼泡沫化要麼倉卒組黨的兩難困境,以及令缺乏領袖、凝聚力大減的國民黨更加邊緣化。而在綠營看來,總統制固然可視為「台灣國族主義」建構的投射,以及落實國民主權的重要象徵,內閣制則更符合台灣建構「公民國族主義」的精神,更能彰顯兩岸制度差異的關鍵所在。

不過,作為中美之間的一個棋子,台灣很難對自己的前途命運真正自主。特朗普當選美國總統之初,一度想質疑「一中」,但後來與習近平首次通話時已經重新確認。他下月的訪華之行,預料在台灣問題上也不會有驚人之舉或突破。倒是美國國務院上月底從官網介紹台灣的頁面上撤除青天白日滿地紅旗圖案,儘管美方稱其政策並無改變,但似乎並非完全是無意義的動作。

中美經過1996年在台灣海峽險些擦槍走火的教訓,近20多年對台海「維持現狀」的政策基本達成共識。隨着中國大陸政經實力愈來愈強,台灣地位愈發孱弱,漸走下坡之路的美國,與中國攤牌的代價會愈來愈大。北京如果對台灣問題保持信心的話,就毋須改變現行政策,即劃定台獨紅線,同時促進兩岸經濟文化融合。當美國發現對台的安全承諾,已到了無法兌現的時候,兩岸情勢恐怕就會發生變化。雖說2020武力攻台之說過於誇張,但兩岸情勢逆轉恐怕不再是遙遙無期。北京讓立場強硬的駐聯合國大使劉結一接掌國台辦,未來大陸的對台政策取態,已可一窺端倪。

Tsai Ing-wen's Double-ten speech

TAIWANESE president Tsai Ing-wen made a speech at last week's "Double-tenth celebration". She did not come up with a new political discourse on cross-strait relations, but instead reiterated her stance that "the good intention remains unchanged, we are still committed to our promises, we are not going down the old road of confrontation, but we will not bow to pressure either". She called on both sides of the strait to seek "a new mode of interaction".

In contrast with Tsai's first "Double-tenth speech" made last year, this year's speech omitted phrases such as "the constitution of the Republic of China", the "Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area" and the "historical fact of the 1992 talks". Even Ma Ying-jeou, the former Taiwanese president, has said that it will be "a very serious" matter if these words were omitted intentionally. What Tsai emphasised in her speech in an extraordinary fashion was how Taiwan's military forces would make war preparations around the clock and other issues related to national defence. It is difficult to say that Tsai was extending an olive branch to the Beijing authorities with her choice of what to include and what to omit in her speech. Tsai also emphasised when announcing that James Soong, Chairman of the People First Party, would take part in this year's APEC summit on behalf of Taiwan that she wished to engage in well-meaning interaction and cooperation with the mainland authorities within the framework of APEC. Leaders of the Beijing authorities must be at a loss how to react, as they have repeatedly insisted that the issue of cross-strait relations must not be handled on a multilateral occasion in the international arena.

Meanwhile, ever since Tsai proposed during the conference of the Democratic Progressive Party last month the subject of constitutional reform, there has been vigorous discussion in Taiwanese society. Issues that have to do with unification or independence are very sensitive, and they can easily have implications for cross-strait relations and regional security.

The issue of Taiwanese constitutional reform touches on different levels. A relatively straightforward issue is lowering the voting age from 20 to 18 and addressing the problem of "votes carrying different weight" caused by difference in population between counties. This is the "shallowest" level of constitutional reform. The second level of reform is turning the current form of semi-presidentialism into a "presidential system" or a "parliamentary system". The third level (which is also the "deepest" level) of reform is the normalisation of the country, and this is related to its stance on cross-strait relations.

China and the United States nearly came into direct conflict due to the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996. Since then, there has been a consensus towards the policy of "maintaining the status quo" over the Taiwan Strait issue between the two countries over the past twenty years or so. As China's political and economic power grows and Taiwan's status lowers, the United States, which is in decline, finds it increasingly costly to raise China's hackles. Such being the case, as long as the Beijing authorities remain confident when it comes to the Taiwan issue, they do not need to change their existing policy, which is to draw a red line at Taiwan's independence and promote the economic and cultural integration of the two regions. When the US understands that its commitment to Taiwan's security can no longer be fulfilled, the situation on both sides of the strait will change. The notion that China will invade Taiwan in 2020 might be far-fetched. But it is no longer unforeseeable for the situation to change radically. That the Beijing authorities have appointed Liu Jieyi, the delegate to the United Nations known for his hardline stance, to head the Taiwan Affairs Office shows exactly what mainland China's policies are towards Taiwan.

雙十講話軟中帶硬 憲改既為選舉也為獨

台灣總統蔡英文上周在雙十慶典的講話中,對於兩岸議題並未有所謂的「新論述」,而是重複「善意不變、承諾不變,不會走回對抗的老路,但也不會在壓力下屈服」,呼籲兩岸尋求「互動新模式」。

與蔡英文去年首個「雙十講話」對比,「中華民國憲法」、「兩岸人民關係條例」、「九二會談的歷史事實」等詞語,今年都未再提起,連前總統馬英九都指出,如果這是刻意迴避,就「非常嚴重」。蔡在講話中反而罕見地大篇幅強調三軍24小時戰備、準備迎戰等防務話題。這一減一增,向北京傳遞的,很難說是什麼善意。至於她在宣布由親民黨主席宋楚瑜代表台灣出席今年亞太經合組織(APEC)峰會時強調,願在APEC架構之下,與大陸進行善意的互動與合作,云云,聽在堅持兩岸問題不能在國際多邊場合談的北京領導人耳中,更是哭笑不得。

另一邊廂,蔡英文上月在民進黨黨代會拋出憲政改革的議題之後,現於台灣社會引發了熱烈討論。涉及統獨的議題十分敏感,隨時牽動兩岸關係和地區安全的神經。

台灣憲改議題涉及不同層面,相對單純的投票權從20歲降至18歲、各縣因人口多寡導致的「票票不等值」等議題,屬最淺層面的憲改;第二層面的改革則是將目前的「雙首長制」改為「總統制」或「內閣制」;第三層面也是最深層面的改革,就是推動「國家正常化」,即涉及兩岸關係的定位。

中美經過1996年在台灣海峽險些擦槍走火的教訓,近20多年對台海「維持現狀」的政策基本達成共識。隨着中國大陸政經實力愈來愈強,台灣地位愈發孱弱,漸走下坡之路的美國,與中國攤牌的代價會愈來愈大。北京如果對台灣問題保持信心的話,就毋須改變現行政策,即劃定台獨紅線,同時促進兩岸經濟文化融合。當美國發現對台的安全承諾,已到了無法兌現的時候,兩岸情勢恐怕就會發生變化。雖說2020武力攻台之說過於誇張,但兩岸情勢逆轉恐怕不再是遙遙無期。北京讓立場強硬的駐聯合國大使劉結一接掌國台辦,未來大陸的對台政策取態,已可一窺端倪。

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