<轉載自2016年9月27日 明報 社評>
台灣未獲國際民航組織（ICAO）邀請出席第39屆大會會議，這是5月20日蔡英文就任總統之後，兩岸首次在國際事務展開角力。在蔡英文政府不認同「九二共識」下，類似暗鬥將陸續有來，馬英九主政期間兩岸的「外交休兵」，勢將不再。兩岸除了就台灣參與國際組織的鬥爭，台灣邦交國爭奪將出現怎樣的局面，島內民情對台灣「外交」受挫會有什麼反應，都值得留意。
國際民航會議破局 外交休兵似已終止
長期以來，台灣一直爭取參與國際組織，涉身國際事務。馬英九執政8年期間，在「九二共識」、「一個中國」原則下，兩岸由陳水扁期間的「烽煙外交」轉而為「外交休兵」，大陸停止挖台灣邦交國的牆腳；據知曾有國家要與台灣斷交，改而與大陸建交，卻被大陸勸止，多年來台灣邦交國因而維持在22個，未有變動。此外，大陸與台灣協商，台灣得以參加世界衛生組織（WHO）的大會、3年前的ICAO大會，台灣也是在「一個中國」原則下獲邀出席。
大陸對蔡英文5．20就職演講未提認同「九二共識」，視為未完成的答卷；4個月以來，她都拒絕補答，只要求大陸釋出更多善意。島內、島外解讀都認為蔡英文不會對大陸讓步，兩岸關係受牽動已在預期之內。今次ICAO大會，台灣陸委會於8月初已經要求與大陸方面協商，不過兩岸的溝通管道已經中斷，大陸方面根本不回應。台灣尋求美國與日本支持，僅獲「支持台灣有意義地參與」的空泛說法，因此台灣對未能參加ICAO大會，早有評估。
雖然未獲邀請，台灣由一名民航局副局長率領的代表團仍然出發到加拿大蒙特里爾，要進行場外活動，云云。從蔡英文、民進黨政府與島內綠營的反應基調來看，顯然是期望以「悲情牌」爭取同情。不過，在以實力為後盾的國際社會，這樣做的效果有限。因為以主權國才可以參與的國際組織和會議，在目前國際認同「一個中國」的原則和前提下，「中國」是指中華人民共和國，台灣很難突破，展望未來也難有改變。
島內有評估認為，ICAO大會破局敲響了警鐘。接下來，蔡英文打算任命親民黨主席宋楚瑜為出席亞太經合組織（APEC）領導人峰會的代表，大陸已經提出反對，能否解決使台灣不至缺席會議，近期總要揭盅；至於國際刑警組織（INTERPOL）等國際會議會否受影響，已經成為懸念。此外，兩岸一旦終止「外交休兵」，隨着大陸與教廷梵蒂岡關係持續升溫，設若教廷與台灣斷交，則台灣在中南美洲多個信奉天主教的邦交國，會否出現雪崩式外交局面，隱約之間已經埋下變數，對蔡英文政府是嚴峻考驗。
蔡英文內外交困 或藉民粹轉視線
蔡英文、民進黨政府與綠營就這次外交失利，對外打悲情牌，對內則操作打壓牌，意圖激起民衆對大陸的不滿；他們強調此舉「嚴重傷害台灣人民的感情」，藉此轉移蔡英文主政未能維持現狀，而是與大陸關係惡化、在國際社會愈趨孤立的實質。不過，島內也不乏「馬英九做得到」、「蔡英文做不到」的聲音。台灣對大陸「政冷經冷」到外交戰場敗退，島內民情有迹象顯示回到十字路口，蔡英文贏得大選時的氣勢明顯折損。昨日，台灣民意基金會公布民調結果，顯示9月份贊同蔡英文處理「國政」方式的人只有44.7%，較5月份剛上台時的69.9%，下跌了25.2個百分點。即是說蔡英文不再得到台灣半數民衆擁護和肯定，她執政剛過4個月，流失支持之迅猛程度，對兩岸關係會帶來什麼影響，值得關注。
值得注意的是，台灣國際空間受打壓，民衆的認知會否都認為蔡英文政府無能？情况或許並非那麼絕對。從蔡英文政府操作ICAO大會失利，訴諸台灣人民的感情看來，設若出現台灣民衆集體心理挫折的效果，激發出來的情緒有3種可能：要求蔡英文政府接受「九二共識」、轉而為更激進地追求台獨、或是轉化為更強烈「反中」。另外，蔡英文若想尋求連任，也面臨調整的關口，她會否為固守基本盤而向深綠傾斜，走上激進台獨以至法理台獨之路等，都是不能排除的可能；近期李登輝等人相繼發話，不無向蔡英文施壓之意。兩岸外交角力放在這個框架觀察，已經不僅是戰役得失，而是關乎兩岸關係整體穩定抑或動盪的審視點了。
Test of
strength on the diplomatic front
THE
TAIWANESE GOVERNMENT has failed to clinch an invitation from the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) to its 39th assembly. This marks the first
confrontation between the two governments across the Taiwan Strait over
international affairs since Tsai Ing-wen was sworn in as president on May 20.
The
Taiwanese authorities have long been striving to play a part in international
organisations and involve themselves in international affairs. During Ma
Ying-jeou's 8-year presidency, relations across the strait were such that both
sides "buried the hatchet", as opposed to the previous state of
"beacon fires" during Chen Shui-bian's presidency, as they stuck to
the principles of the "1992 consensus" and "one China". The
mainland authorities stopped "poaching" Taiwan's diplomatic allies.
It is understood that some countries actually intended to break off diplomatic
relations with Taiwan and establish relations with mainland China. But the
mainland authorities dissuaded them from doing so. As a result, the number of
Taiwan's diplomatic allies remained unchanged at 22 for several years.
Furthermore, as a result of negotiations between the two sides, Taiwan was able
to attend the assembly of the World Health Organisation (WHO). It was also on
the principle of "one China" that Taiwan was invited to the ICAO
assembly three years ago.
Tsai's
failure to acknowledge the "1992 consensus" in her inaugural address
is viewed by the mainland authorities as a failure to "complete the
examination paper". For four months she has refused to "retake the
paper", saying only that she wants the mainland authorities to offer more
olive branches. Since observers within and without Taiwan were agreed that Tsai
would not give in to mainland China, the disruptions to cross-strait relations
have come as no surprise. Back in early August, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs
Council demanded negotiations with mainland China over this year's ICAO
assembly. But since the channels for communication across the strait were
already closed, the mainland government made no response at all. The Taiwan
government subsequently sought support from the US and Japan, only to receive
the vague response that "the US supports Taiwan's meaningful participation
in the ICAO assembly". It was foreseen that Taiwan would not be invited to
the ICAO assembly.
That,
however, did not stop a delegation led by a Deputy Director General of the
Civil Aeronautics Administration from heading for Montreal, Canada, who said
they were going to join the assembly from outside. As is obvious from the
responses made by Tsai, the government controlled by the Democratic Progressive
Party and the green camp on the island, they are hoping to win sympathy by
displaying their sorrows. However, in an international community where actual
strengths matter, such a tactic is unlikely to be successful.
It
is noteworthy whether the Taiwanese public will attribute Taiwan's shrinking
diplomatic room to the ineptitude of Tsai's government. But few things are
certain. As can be seen from the Tsai administration's experiment with public
sentiment after its failure in the ICAO assembly issue, the collective
frustration of the Taiwanese public could trigger three types of emotional
reactions: the demand that Tsai's government should accept the "1992
consensus", more intense longing for Taiwan's independence, or more fierce
opposition to China. Furthermore, in case Tsai wants to seek re-election, she
is now at a juncture. The possibilities of her moving to the deep green (in an
attempt to consolidate her political base) and pursuing Taiwan's "radical independence"
or "jurisprudential independence" cannot be ruled out. The opinions
expressed by Lee Teng-hui and others recently are nothing short of an attempt
to put pressure on Tsai. Looked at from this perspective, the ongoing test of strength
on the diplomatic front is much more about who will win and who will lose. It
will provide a vantage point for the observation of the stability of
cross-strait relations.
兩岸外交角力重啟 蔡英文民望陷低谷
台灣未獲國際民航組織（ICAO）邀請出席第39屆大會會議，這是5月20日蔡英文就任總統之後，兩岸首次在國際事務展開角力。
長期以來，台灣一直爭取參與國際組織，涉身國際事務。馬英九執政8年期間，在「九二共識」、「一個中國」原則下，兩岸由陳水扁期間的「烽煙外交」轉而為「外交休兵」，大陸停止挖台灣邦交國的牆腳；據知曾有國家要與台灣斷交，改而與大陸建交，卻被大陸勸止，多年來台灣邦交國因而維持在22個，未有變動。此外，大陸與台灣協商，台灣得以參加世界衛生組織（WHO）的大會、3年前的ICAO大會，台灣也是在「一個中國」原則下獲邀出席。
大陸對蔡英文5．20就職演講未提認同「九二共識」，視為未完成的答卷；4個月以來，她都拒絕補答，只要求大陸釋出更多善意。島內、島外解讀都認為蔡英文不會對大陸讓步，兩岸關係受牽動已在預期之內。今次ICAO大會，台灣陸委會於8月初已經要求與大陸方面協商，不過兩岸的溝通管道已經中斷，大陸方面根本不回應。台灣尋求美國與日本支持，僅獲「支持台灣有意義地參與」的空泛說法，因此台灣對未能參加ICAO大會，早有評估。
雖然未獲邀請，台灣由一名民航局副局長率領的代表團仍然出發到加拿大蒙特里爾，要進行場外活動，云云。從蔡英文、民進黨政府與島內綠營的反應基調來看，顯然是期望以「悲情牌」爭取同情。不過，在以實力為後盾的國際社會，這樣做的效果有限。
值得注意的是，台灣國際空間受打壓，民衆的認知會否都認為蔡英文政府無能？情况或許並非那麼絕對。從蔡英文政府操作ICAO大會失利，訴諸台灣人民的感情看來，設若出現台灣民衆集體心理挫折的效果，激發出來的情緒有3種可能：要求蔡英文政府接受「九二共識」、轉而為更激進地追求台獨、或是轉化為更強烈「反中」。另外，蔡英文若想尋求連任，也面臨調整的關口，她會否為固守基本盤而向深綠傾斜，走上激進台獨以至法理台獨之路等，都是不能排除的可能；近期李登輝等人相繼發話，不無向蔡英文施壓之意。兩岸外交角力放在這個框架觀察，已經不僅是戰役得失，而是關乎兩岸關係整體穩定抑或動盪的審視點了。
