<轉載自2016年9月12日 明報 社評>
在上周的杭州G20峰會期間，國家主席習近平和美國總統奧巴馬舉行了一場令人矚目的會談，議題涉及南海、朝核、反恐、兩國軍方管控分歧等諸多領域。出乎觀察家事前預料的，習近平強調「堅決遏制任何形式的台獨分裂行徑」，「希望美方恪守一個中國政策和中美三個聯合公報原則」，並指這是「維護中美合作大局」的實際行動。奧巴馬回應，美方奉行一個中國政策沒有改變，「不支持任何尋求台灣獨立的做法」。這番對話，似乎是中國對美國打預防針，也說明北京與蔡英文冷對抗式的交手，已經擴展到國際領域。
一年一度的亞太經合組織（APEC）峰會11月將在秘魯舉行，台灣代表人選角力已經開打。按照台灣加入APEC時簽訂的入會備忘錄，台灣以經濟體名義參加只能派財經首長與會。兩岸關係好的時候也有特例，不過都由主辦國事前要求台灣提人選，再徵得北京同意，三方達成共識後，由主辦國發出邀請函。在陳水扁執政期間，曾提出由卸任副總統李元簇出席上海APEC，但被北京否決，阿扁賭氣之下台灣缺席那次峰會。後來，阿扁還是低頭，分別派過中央研究院院長李遠哲、總統府資政林信義、台積電董事長張忠謀及宏碁董事長施振榮等代表出席。
APEC台方代表人選角力 通關密鑰是「九二共識」
到了馬英九執政時期，台灣參與APEC峰會的領袖代表獲升級，曾任副總統的連戰和蕭萬長都可與會。北京涉台人士解釋，關鍵在兩岸互信，有「九二共識」的共同政治基礎。近日，傳出蔡英文有意指派親民黨主席宋楚瑜為出席APEC特使，但被北京否決。就此，蔡英文和宋楚瑜方面尚未證實，北京也未正式表態，不過一般相信，蔡英文是放消息出來測試水溫，結果是此路不通。北京清華大學台研院副院長巫永平指出，北京對宋楚瑜並不感冒，說白一點，「橘子變綠是吃不了的」。而更多涉台學者說，問題關鍵在政策不在人選，APEC通關要有密鑰，這個密鑰就是「九二共識」，只要蔡不承認「九二共識」，其任內4年的APEC應回到阿扁模式，只能派企業界、學術界人士出席。
今天，台灣海基會新董事長田弘茂正式上任，有人還期望他上台會對「九二共識」有說法，其實重要的不是田弘茂表態，而是蔡英文表態。之前，王金平、宋楚瑜等是海基會董座候選人，固然被演繹為蔡英文分裂藍營，但是也可以解釋為對大陸留有轉圜餘地。但是，最終由扁政府的外交部長田弘茂出任，說明蔡政府已經做好了兩岸協商至少4年內全面停擺的心理準備。事實上，當下兩岸小小的事情都會擦出火花。例如，台北國立故宮博物院前院長馮明珠受聘擔任北京故宮的顧問，民進黨立委紛紛指其可能泄密。其實所謂故宮機密無非就是藏品目錄和收藏技術，無論從何種角度看，都對弘揚中華文化有益，並無傷害台灣寸意。
兩岸未來戰場在國際 習奧會中方發出信號
平實看兩岸，相互探底期已經結束，蔡英文「未完成的答卷」其實很清楚了。大陸方面有人以為蔡英文執政百日民望急劇下滑，施政處處碰壁，倒閣之聲不絕，遊行示威陸續有來，蔡英文可能因此迷途知返，重回馬英九的兩岸關係軌道。事實上，蔡英文的執政基礎相當鞏固，即使民望下跌，支持度還在一半左右，雖然大陸遊客減少致觀光業不滿，但出口已由負轉正，當前的壓力並不足以令她改變既定政策。
蔡英文的執政策略有3條支柱：第一，鞏固台灣的「主體性」以鞏固民進黨的執政和對抗大陸的政治基礎。當下，藉清算不當黨產，對國民黨「挖祖墳」，就是其中一環。第二，推行「新南向」政策，加大台灣經濟的自主性，減少對大陸的依賴。第三，尋求以台灣為主體實質參與國際社會，要「讓台灣走向世界，也要讓世界走進台灣」，這也是蔡政府尋求國際保護的策略。最近，台灣軍方稱大陸在做2020年攻台準備，其實蔡英文清楚在她決心不承認「九二共識」之後的兩岸角力，重點在文鬥而非武鬥；抓牢台灣的「主體性」民意，減少對大陸經濟依賴並得到美日支持，北京便奈何不了。
於是，國際舞台將會上升為兩岸角力的重要戰場。蔡政府清不當黨產、改「課綱」，大陸只能隔岸觀火，北京也不能制裁大陸台商。因此，習近平要求奧巴馬重申不支持台獨，也可以視為北京壓縮台灣國際空間的一個信號，下一步不一定是與梵蒂岡建交，但是挖走台灣其他邦交國則不無可能。
Beijing tackles Taiwan on the diplomatic front
AT THE G20 SUMMIT in
Hangzhou last week, all eyes were on the talk between Xi Jinping, the Chinese
President and US President Barack Obama, during which they discussed a wide
array of topics ranging from the South China Sea, North Korea's nuclear test,
measures against terrorism to the two countries' differences on the control of
their military forces. What observers had not expected was that, during the
meeting, Xi stressed China's "determination to stop Taiwan's independence
or separatism in any shape or form" and expressed hope that "the US
will stick to its one-China policy and the principles laid out in the Three
Communiqués", adding that the US had to put all that into practice in
order to "preserve the framework of cooperation between China and the
US". Barack Obama, in response, said that the US's one-China policy
remains unchanged and that the US "does not support any attempts to seek
Taiwan's independence". The conversation has the effect of China isolating
the US from Taiwan independence. It also shows that the Beijing authorities'
confrontation with Tsai Ing-wen is spilling over to the international arena.
It has recently been
reported that Tsai was thinking about appointing James Soong, Chairman of the
People First Party, as a special envoy to APEC, but the idea has been vetoed by
the Beijing authorities. The cross-strait relations, if looked at objectively,
are now well past the period of each side testing the other's bottom line. It
is now concluded that Tsai has failed to attempt the "unfinished
test". When Tsai's popularity took a nosedive 100 days into her
presidency, her administration experienced a lot of setbacks, there were
repeated calls to topple the cabinet, and parades and demonstrations were in
the pipeline, some people on the mainland thought that Tsai might sooner or
later change course and return to the cross-strait policies pursued by Ma
Ying-jeou. But in fact, Tsai's grip on power remains solid. Her approval
rating, though lower compared with the time she was sworn in, remains around 50
per cent. True, the declining numbers of mainland visitors have dismayed the
tourist industry. But Taiwan's exports are back in positive territory. The
pressure she is faced with is not so strong as to make her change her ways.
Tsai's administrative
strategies are composed of three pillars. The first is the consolidation of
Taiwan's self-identification with the aim of strengthening the Democratic
Progressive Party's administration and countering mainland China politics. The
confiscation of property improperly acquired by political parties, referred to
as "the excavation of the family tombs" of the Chinese National
Party, is part of it. The second is the "New Southward Policy" aimed
at enhancing the self-sufficiency of the Taiwanese economy and reducing its
dependence on mainland China. The third is Taiwan's engagement with the
international community with the aim of "bringing Taiwan to the world and
bringing the world to Taiwan". This is the Tsai administration's strategy
of seeking international protection of Taiwan. The Taiwanese military has
recently declared that mainland China is making preparations for its invasion
of Taiwan in 2020. But in fact, Tsai has known very well since she resolved not
to recognise the 1992 consensus that the confrontation between both sides
across the Taiwan Strait will be centred on the diplomatic - rather than
military - front. There is little the Beijing authorities can do as long as she
can use Taiwanese people's self-identification to her advantage, reduce
Taiwan's dependence on the mainland economy and secure the support of the US
and Japan.
In this light, the
international arena is likely to become a major battleground between both sides
across the Taiwan Strait. The Beijing authorities have no choice but to remain
on the sidelines when Tsai's administration is busy confiscating improperly
acquired property and repealing controversial changes to the high school
curriculum. Neither can they impose sanctions against Taiwan merchants doing
business on mainland China. Seen against such a backdrop, Xi's demand that
Barack Obama reiterate his objection to Taiwan's independence is a signal that
the Beijing authorities are trying to limit the room for Taiwan's diplomatic
manoeuvre. Beijing may or may not establish diplomatic relations with Vatican
City. But it can definitely make countries with diplomatic relations with
Taiwan part company with it.
兩岸冷對抗持續升溫 台國際空間或被壓縮
在上周的杭州G20峰會期間，國家主席習近平和美國總統奧巴馬舉行了一場令人矚目的會談，議題涉及南海、朝核、反恐、兩國軍方管控分歧等諸多領域。出乎觀察家事前預料的，習近平強調「堅決遏制任何形式的台獨分裂行徑」，「希望美方恪守一個中國政策和中美三個聯合公報原則」，並指這是「維護中美合作大局」的實際行動。奧巴馬回應，美方奉行一個中國政策沒有改變，「不支持任何尋求台灣獨立的做法」。這番對話，似乎是中國對美國打預防針，也說明北京與蔡英文冷對抗式的交手，已經擴展到國際領域。
近日，傳出蔡英文有意指派親民黨主席宋楚瑜為出席APEC特使，但被北京否決。平實看兩岸，相互探底期已經結束，蔡英文「未完成的答卷」其實很清楚了。大陸方面有人以為蔡英文執政百日民望急劇下滑，施政處處碰壁，倒閣之聲不絕，遊行示威陸續有來，蔡英文可能因此迷途知返，重回馬英九的兩岸關係軌道。事實上，蔡英文的執政基礎相當鞏固，即使民望下跌，支持度還在一半左右，雖然大陸遊客減少致觀光業不滿，但出口已由負轉正，當前的壓力並不足以令她改變既定政策。
蔡英文的執政策略有3條支柱：第一，鞏固台灣的「主體性」以鞏固民進黨的執政和對抗大陸的政治基礎。當下，藉清算不當黨產，對國民黨「挖祖墳」，就是其中一環。第二，推行「新南向」政策，加大台灣經濟的自主性，減少對大陸的依賴。第三，尋求以台灣為主體實質參與國際社會，要「讓台灣走向世界，也要讓世界走進台灣」，這也是蔡政府尋求國際保護的策略。最近，台灣軍方稱大陸在做2020年攻台準備，其實蔡英文清楚在她決心不承認「九二共識」之後的兩岸角力，重點在文鬥而非武鬥；抓牢台灣的「主體性」民意，減少對大陸經濟依賴並得到美日支持，北京便奈何不了。
於是，國際舞台將會上升為兩岸角力的重要戰場。蔡政府清不當黨產、改「課綱」，大陸只能隔岸觀火，北京也不能制裁大陸台商。因此，習近平要求奧巴馬重申不支持台獨，也可以視為北京壓縮台灣國際空間的一個信號，下一步不一定是與梵蒂岡建交，但是挖走台灣其他邦交國則不無可能。
