2022年9月25日 星期日

貪腐土壤仍在滋長 外來監督不可或缺

<轉載自2022926 明報 社評>

習近平2012年中共十八大就任總書記,開始雷厲風行打擊貪污腐敗,10年以來夙興夜寐,陸續打掉周永康、薄熙來、郭伯雄、徐才厚、孫政才和令計劃等中共和軍隊高層的六大「貪腐老將」,並且宣布反腐永遠在路上,剛剛又宣判了孫力軍等6人的「政治團伙」,成績斐然。可是,這些「貪腐新星」不但在十八大以來不收斂,還變本加厲,說明中共要令到幹部不想貪、不敢貪、不能貪,這個目標還沒有達到。寄望即將召開的中共二十大,能夠提出一套更加完備的制度,讓發現貪腐行為的官員和百姓,想舉報、敢舉報、能舉報。

傅政華十八大以後連升三級 被判終身監禁不得減刑假釋

自十八大以來,全國檢察機關一共立案偵查貪腐案438萬件和470萬人。大規模查處貪腐,中共稱之為刮骨療毒式的自我革命,其動機以及成績都不容置疑。習近平上任後旋即頒布「八項規定」,對黨員幹部在施政和個人行為準則提出嚴格要求,並且在2016年進一步提出不想貪、不敢貪、不能貪,要從機制上有所保證,及後修改了《中共紀律處分條例》,將各種要求及處分方式條文化。

習近平對於打擊貪腐,是以從嚴治黨的角度開展和進行的,對黨員要求嚴格,一旦發現違規,嚴肅懲處,藉此達到不敢貪的目的。周永康等「六大老虎」被控多項罪名,都因為受賄被判無期徒刑。這次孫力軍等6人的「政治團伙」也被控多項罪名,其中孫力軍、傅政華和王立科3人因受賄罪,被判死刑緩刑,但緩刑過後轉無期徒刑,終身監禁,不得減刑、假釋。從處罰程度看,確實是更加嚴格,至於殺雞儆猴是否能夠令幹部不敢貪,卻不能樂觀。

官員因為巨額受賄而得到終身監禁的處分,已經是極限了,國際上絕大多數國家對於貪污罪都不會判處和執行死刑的。孫力軍等3人獲刑終身監禁是根據受賄罪名,但他們被指控的還有對中共而言更嚴重的罪行。孫力軍被指:「政治野心極度膨脹,政治品質極為惡劣,權力觀、政績觀極度扭曲,妄議黨中央大政方針,製造散佈政治謠言,陽奉陰違,欺上瞞下,撈取政治資本;為實現個人政治目的,不擇手段,操弄權術,在黨內大搞團團伙伙、拉幫結派、培植個人勢力,形成利益集團,成伙作勢控制要害部門,嚴重破壞黨的團結統一,嚴重危害政治安全。」而有關政治野心、政治品質和拉幫結派等罪行,並非《刑法》規定,而是按照中共黨內的紀律處分條例,現在的判刑,名義上是按《刑法》違反受賄規定,實質上是因為「嚴重危害政治安全」違反黨內條例。

沒有人會對孫力軍等人的刑罰有意見,明面上按照《刑法》,實質懲處違反黨規,給出的信號是含糊的,幹部或許會認為,即使貪污巨款,只要不在黨內搞拉幫結派,就不會被重判。所以,能否起到不敢貪的作用,還是存在疑問。

至於如何達至不想貪,是通過要求黨員幹部不斷重讀黨章、反覆重溫入黨誓言、不停表示與黨中央保持一致?然而,從傅政華和王立科等人的罪行看,他們「從未真正忠誠於黨和人民,徹底喪失黨性原則」,即是說他們從入黨一刻,就從未忠誠過,反覆要求他們「不忘初心」是毫無作用的,反而會令基層黨員反感,為什麼從未忠誠過的黨員,卻可以步步高陞,竊居高位。

官員從基層邊貪邊升級 內部監督機制未能臻善

要真正做到令黨員幹部不能貪,只有制度保證才能有效。從孫力軍等6人被起訴的罪名看,干犯的罪行都是從他們任職基層開始,而他們都在中共十八大以後平步青雲,傅政華從北京市公安局長連升三級,至公安部常務副部長和司法部長。不禁令人疑惑,為什麼他們在每升一級的時候,都沒有經過嚴格審核。財政部門要求開支要公開招標、審計部門對財政預算結算每年審計、組織部門對幹部表現每年考核,但他們幾十年來貪贓枉法,卻一直毫無察覺,是否說明對於限制幹部不能貪的制度失效,值得深思。

任何制度的執行都需要監督,中共採取的做法是由中紀委定時派出工作組到各基層單位實施監督,每到一個地方,都公開接受舉報的電話,也主動邀請基層幹部發表意見,確實起到很大的作用,很多貪腐案件都是通過這個辦法揭發和查處的。然而,如果紀委工作組辦事不力,或者官官相護,作用也會大打折扣,而且在平常狀態下如何接受群眾檢舉貪腐情况,也缺乏行之有效的機制。

內部監督未能完全發揮效應,貪腐土壤會繼續滋長,外部監督可以與內部監督互為補足,舉報渠道應該廣泛且敞開大門,甚至應該給予鼓勵措施,才能做到令熟悉政府部門運作的內部官員,以及必須與政府部門打交道的老百姓能舉報,中央需要保護舉報者,令他們不會被打擊報復,才能令他們敢舉報,而有關舉報得到認真調查和公正處置,才能令人想舉報。缺乏外部監督,貪官還會肆無忌憚地「前腐後繼」。

External Monitoring is Essential for Stamping Out Corruption

When Xi Jinping took office as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the party's 18th National Congress in 2012, he began to crack down on corruption. Since then, he has ousted Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, Sun Zhengcai and Ling Jihua, the so-called top six "hardened corrupt officials" in the CCP and the upper echelons of the army. He has also announced that anti-corruption is always in progress, and has just meted out sentencing to the "political gang" of six people including Sun Lijun.

When Xi Jinping took office as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the party's 18th National Congress in 2012, he began to crack down on corruption. Since then, he has ousted Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, Sun Zhengcai and Ling Jihua, the so-called top six "hardened corrupt officials" in the CCP and the upper echelons of the army. He has also announced that anti-corruption is always in progress, and has just meted out sentencing to the "political gang" of six people including Sun Lijun.

Sun Lijun has been accused of "harbouring extremely inflated political ambition and having extremely vicious political quality. He has an extremely distorted view on power and political achievements, arbitrarily commenting on the overall policy directions of the Central Committee of the CCP. He has manufactured and spread political rumours. He is seemingly obedient but clandestinely hostile, deceiving both his seniors and subordinates to gain political capital. To realise his personal political objectives, he has employed all sorts of unscrupulous means to manipulate power. He has created his faction within the party to cultivate his individual influence and formed vested interests to control key departments, thus seriously damaging the unity of the party and endangering political security." The crimes related to political ambition, political quality and faction forming are not delineated in the Criminal Law, but have been established in accordance with the disciplinary regulations within the CCP. On the surface, the sentencing was based on the provisions on bribery in the Criminal Law, but in essence was due to the "serious endangerment of political security", a violation of party regulations.

No one will disagree with the punishment of Sun Lijun and others. On the surface, the sentencing was based on the Criminal Law, but the actual punishment was for their violation of party rules. The message that has been sent is ambiguous. Some party cadres might think that even if a large amount of money is involved in bribery, as long as they do not form their own cliques within the party, they will not be punished severely. Therefore, it is still questionable whether the sentencing can deter people from corruption.

Only institutions can effectively guarantee that party members and cadres are deterred from taking bribes. Judging from the charges against six people including Sun Lijun, the crimes they committed all started when they began down low in the hierarchy. One cannot help but wonder why they did not go through strict examinations every time they were promoted. Financial departments require expenditure items to be put out to tender. Audit departments audit final financial budgets every year. Organisation departments evaluate the performance of cadres yearly. But Sun and others have been corrupted for decades, and no one was able to uncover their corruption. It is food for thought whether the system for preventing cadres from corruption is effective.

Internal oversight has not been fully effective, and the soil of corruption will continue to grow. External oversight and internal oversight can complement each other. Channels for reporting should be wide open, and incentives should even be offered so that domestic officials familiar with the workings of government departments and ordinary people who have to deal with government departments are able to blow the whistle. The central government needs to protect whistleblowers so that they will not be subject to reprisal. Only then can they dare to blow the whistle, and relevant reports will be seriously investigated and dealt with fairly. This, in turn, makes people want to blow the whistle. Without external oversight, corrupt officials will engage in corruption one after another and with no qualms.

貪腐土壤仍在滋長 外來監督不可或缺

習近平2012年中共十八大就任總書記,開始雷厲風行打擊貪污腐敗,陸續打掉周永康、薄熙來、郭伯雄、徐才厚、孫政才和令計劃等中共和軍隊高層的六大「貪腐老將」,並且宣布反腐永遠在路上,剛剛又宣判了孫力軍等6人的「政治團伙」。

孫力軍被指:「政治野心極度膨脹,政治品質極為惡劣,權力觀、政績觀極度扭曲,妄議黨中央大政方針,製造散佈政治謠言,陽奉陰違,欺上瞞下,撈取政治資本;為實現個人政治目的,不擇手段,操弄權術,在黨內大搞團團伙伙、拉幫結派、培植個人勢力,形成利益集團,成伙作勢控制要害部門,嚴重破壞黨的團結統一,嚴重危害政治安全。」而有關政治野心、政治品質和拉幫結派等罪行,並非《刑法》規定,而是按照中共黨內的紀律處分條例,現在的判刑,名義上是按《刑法》違反受賄規定,實質上是因為「嚴重危害政治安全」違反黨內條例。

沒有人會對孫力軍等人的刑罰有意見,表面上按照《刑法》,實質懲處違反黨規,給出的信號是含糊的,幹部或許會認為,即使貪污巨款,只要不在黨內搞拉幫結派,就不會被重判。所以,能否起到不敢貪的作用,還是存在疑問。

要真正做到令黨員幹部不能貪,只有制度保證才能有效。從孫力軍等6人被起訴的罪名看,干犯的罪行都是從他們任職基層開始,不禁令人疑惑,為什麼他們在每升一級的時候,都沒有經過嚴格審核。財政部門要求開支要公開招標、審計部門對財政預算結算每年審計、組織部門對幹部表現每年考核,但他們幾十年來貪贓枉法,卻一直毫無察覺,是否說明對於限制幹部不能貪的制度失效,值得深思。

內部監督未能完全發揮效應,貪腐土壤會繼續滋長,外部監督可以與內部監督互為補足,舉報渠道應該廣泛且敞開大門,甚至應該給予鼓勵措施,才能做到令熟悉政府部門運作的內部官員,以及必須與政府部門打交道的老百姓舉報,中央需要保護舉報者,令他們不會被打擊報復,才能令他們敢舉報,而有關舉報得到認真調查和公正處置,才能令人想舉報。缺乏外部監督,貪官還會肆無忌憚地「前腐後繼」。

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