<轉載自2015年7月27日 明報 社評>
中國對日本的外交方針,長期以來是國人感到迷惑的國策﹕到底與日本的關係應該是什麼形態,多年來處於翻來覆去的不明朗狀態。過去幾年,因為釣魚島糾紛,中日關係出現變化,雙方軍機船艦你來我往、訪日代表團臨時取消;不旋踵近期北京隱現軟化之象,日本國會眾議院通過新安保法案,明顯脫離戰後行之半世紀的和平憲法。可是,中國的反應流於「敦促日本堅持和平發展道路」的溫和取態,敏感的人們或會得出一種感覺﹕中國對日本的政策正從強硬轉向溫和。是否如此需要驗證,但觀乎過去兩星期北京的態度,有此想法不足為奇。
安保法案通過 北京反應溫和
最新發展是國家主席習近平邀請日本首相安倍晉三訪華,參加抗日戰爭勝利70周年紀念活動;日本對此未置可否,反而拋出安倍晉三或會在這一段時間前後正式訪華。日本傳媒日前報道,中方提出安倍晉三訪華「三原則」,包括﹕一、日方須遵循中日之間四個政治文件;二、日方須恪守前首相村山富巿談話的精神;三、安倍晉三承諾不參拜靖國神社。事實是否如此,北京至今諱莫如深,然而這三項只算是「極為溫和」的條件發酵的話,而北京有關部門不表反應,就會令國人認為,中國對日本關係又出現變數。
誠然,兩國交惡,不必事事訴諸武力,但中日之間的關係確是其他國家罕見。侵華戰爭結束70年,日本依然未見真正反省致歉迹象,持同一看法的不僅中國,韓國也有類似態度。日本何以至此,實不難理解,外在因素有美國的西太平洋戰略,藉支持日本成為美國在區內的主要盟友,建構對抗中國的橋頭堡。此一戰略早於韓戰後已經出現,從未變更。日本得到美國背書,因此對侵略戰爭的禍害態度模糊,不過當時囿於和平憲法,右翼政客不敢輕舉妄動;海峽兩岸則由於兄弟鬩牆,有一段時間簡直是爭相向日本獻媚,日本在兩岸之間游走,要盡甜頭,可憐是對日態度隨着兩岸鬥爭時軟時硬,慘被消費淨盡。
若說1980年代日本修改教科書是一小撮右翼政客所作所為,但近年大規模修憲舉動以及新安保法案出台,則是從根本上改變日本軍事戰略;伴隨着的是日本對侵略歷史的態度,從戰後多年的「是非論」急變成如今的「博弈論」。這是蒙蔽日本社會以及各國的手段,由侵略戰爭的根本對錯,轉移視線以修憲或新安保法案來「反制」所謂「中國威脅」。因此,日本策略是一面鼓吹「中國威脅論」,同一時間推出新安保法案,例子是近期提出中國「在東海開發天然氣田」照片,以此為新安保法案導致安倍晉三下挫的民望護航。
是非論變成博弈論 日本模糊侵略史實
面對日本花招,近年聲聲推動「大國外交」的中國政府反應令人失望。不僅是對新安保法案通過的反應呈現較前軟化迹象,且在邀請安倍晉三訪華一事尤見被動。如今日本傳媒報道所謂「中方三條件」,其實是過去多年對日本的基本態度——對村山富巿談話安倍晉三不作明確表態;不去靖國神社參拜的要求更是作用不大,因為安倍晉三今年4月春祭「人不到禮到」,人沒有去,卻以內閣總理大臣名義送上祭品;包括《中日聯合聲明》及《中日和平友好條約》等四份中日文件,日方一直聲稱遵從。據此,日本完全符合所謂「三個條件」,安倍晉三遂可挾着新安保法案通過的勢頭來到北京,向全世界留下「中日關係和好」的印象;若然情况如此發展,北京勢必陷於被動。
對日本的態度必須有理有節,中國在這方面遠比韓國差,2012年,時任韓國總統李明博公開表示,如果日皇訪韓,只是對當年在日本殖民治下爭取朝鮮獨立的犧牲者表示「深感痛惜」而非真心道歉,日皇就不必訪問韓國了。人們對和平有所期許,不希望東海變成火海,但不等於在對日本的原則上進退失據腳步輕浮。國與國之間可以有方方面面的交流,但原則絕對不可以用來做交易,這一點,北京袞袞諸公必須明白。
China's policy towards Japan
CHINA'S
diplomatic policy towards Japan has long puzzled Chinese people. It has long
been unclear how Sino-Japanese relations should be. They have changed in recent
years because of the Diaoyu disputes. There were encounters involving the two
countries' warplanes and warships, and Beijing once cancelled at the eleventh
hour its plan to send a delegation to the country. But soon afterwards Beijing
showed signs of softening its stance. It is quite clear that the new security
bills that have gone through the Lower House of the National Diet of Japan are
at odds with the "peace constitution" of the country. However, China
has responded to that very mildly. It has only "urged that Japan stick to
its path of peaceful development". The sensitive may therefore feel
China's policy towards Japan (which was once tough) has become mild. It remains
to be seen whether this is the case, but it is not at all surprising for people
to think so, given the way Beijing has conducted itself over the past two weeks.
In
the latest development, President Xi Jinping has invited Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe to come to China to take part in its activities to mark its
victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. Japan is
noncommittal about that but has indicated that Abe may visit China before or
after such events. It has been reported in the Japanese media that China has
laid down three principles concerning Abe's China visit - (1) that Japan should
abide by the four political documents governing Sino-Japanese relations; (2)
that it should adhere to the spirit of the Tomiichi Murayama statement; and (3)
that Abe should pledge not to pay homage at the Yasukuni Shrine. Is this the
case? Beijing has not uttered a single word about that. Nevertheless, if the
three conditions (which can only be described as "extremely mild")
keep "fermenting" and the Beijing authorities concerned refrain from
making any response, Chinese people may think China's relations with Japan will
again become variable.
What
the Chinese government (which has in recent years claimed to pursue "power
diplomacy") has done in response to Japan's tricks is disappointing. Not
only does it seem weak about the passage of the new security bills, but it has
also appeared very much in passivity in inviting Abe to visit China. What is
called "China's three conditions" in Japanese media reports basically
represents the attitude China has adhered to for years towards Japan. Abe never
declares where he stands on the Murayama statement. The condition that Abe
should refrain from paying homage at the Yasukuni Shrine does not amount to
much because, last April, instead of going there to take part in a Spring
memorial ceremony, he had a ritual offering sent there in his capacity as Prime
Minister of Japan. As for the four documents governing Sino-Japanese relations
(including the Joint Communiqué and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and
Friendship), Japan has always declared it abides by them. Therefore, Japan
meets what is called "the three conditions". Consequently, Abe may
visit Beijing though the new security bills have gone through the Lower House
of the National Diet of Japan. When he does so, he will give the world the
impression that China and Japan have been reconciled. If things unfold this way,
Beijing will doubtless fall into passivity.
People
crave peace. None wants the East China Sea to become a sea of fire. However, it
does not follow that Beijing should be so nonplussed as not to hold fast to the
principles governing its dealings with Japan. A country may have all sorts of
exchanges with another, but under no circumstances should principles be traded
out. This the big shots in Beijing ought to understand.
對日政策須長期一致 堅持立場原則不可讓
中國對日本的外交方針,長期以來是國人感到迷惑的國策﹕到底與日本的關係應該是什麼形態,多年來處於不明朗狀態。過去幾年,因為釣魚島糾紛,中日關係出現變化,雙方軍機船艦你來我往、訪日代表團臨時取消;不旋踵近期北京隱現軟化之象,日本國會眾議院通過新安保法案,明顯脫離和平憲法。可是,中國的反應流於「敦促日本堅持和平發展道路」的溫和取態,敏感的人們或會得出一種感覺﹕中國對日本的政策正從強硬轉向溫和。是否如此需要驗證,但觀乎過去兩星期北京的態度,有此想法不足為奇。
最新發展是國家主席習近平邀請日本首相安倍晉三訪華,參加抗日戰爭勝利70周年紀念活動;日本對此未置可否,反而拋出安倍晉三或會在這一段時間前後正式訪華。日本傳媒日前報道,中方提出安倍晉三訪華「三原則」:一、日方須遵循中日之間四個政治文件;二、日方須恪守前首相村山富巿談話的精神;三、安倍晉三承諾不參拜靖國神社。事實是否如此,北京至今諱莫如深,然而這三項只算是「極為溫和」的條件發酵的話,而北京有關部門不表反應,就會令國人認為,中國對日本關係又出現變數。
面對日本花招,近年聲聲推動「大國外交」的中國政府反應令人失望。不僅是對新安保法案通過的反應呈現較前軟化迹象,且在邀請安倍晉三訪華一事尤見被動。如今日本傳媒報道所謂「中方三條件」,其實是過去多年對日本的基本態度——對村山富巿談話安倍晉三不作明確表態;不去靖國神社參拜的要求更是作用不大,因為安倍晉三今年4月春祭「人不到禮到」,人沒有去,卻以內閣總理大臣名義送上祭品;包括《中日聯合聲明》及《中日和平友好條約》等四份中日文件,日方一直聲稱遵從。據此,日本完全符合所謂「三個條件」,安倍晉三遂可挾着新安保法案通過的勢頭來到北京,向全世界留下「中日關係和好」的印象;若然情况如此發展,北京勢必陷於被動。
人們對和平有所期許,不希望東海變成火海,但不等於在對日本的原則上進退失據腳步輕浮。國與國之間可以有方方面面的交流,但原則絕對不可以用來做交易,這一點,北京袞袞諸公必須明白。